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Summary 
 
This thesis will study how international aid affects business development. This has been 
studied through fieldwork in the West Bank city Nablus.  
Our theoretical framework focuses on different aspects of the definition of development, 
the relief and development debate, and how politics influences aid. It also looks at the 
accessibility of aid through coordination and communication.  
 Coordination of aid distribution is not always an easy task. There are many actors, with 
different agendas and mandates (Kruke & Olsen, 2010). In order to get the best possible 
outcome it is essential that the beneficiaries are a part of the process and able to share their 
opinions.  
To see how international aid affects business development the thesis has looked at how 
budget support to the PA affects the private business sector. In our opinion the budget 
support has an indirect effect on business development. It makes the private business sector 
vulnerable for outside pressure from donors holding back aid for political reasons. The 
consequence being that the PA cannot pay salaries to their employees.  With the PA being a 
major employer in the oPt, this has consequences for the private sector.  
When international aid is given over time and in large amounts, dependency can occur. For 
the society to recover from aid dependency it is essential for the private sector to grow. 
Businesses are also affected by the occupation from Israel, with a big problem being the 
restrictions on movement of goods and labor. Aid is also being used to finance the damages 
caused by the occupation, which indirectly makes them to pay for the destruction.  
The thesis has also studied how local resources are included in the aid distributions process 
in private sector business development. The donors and INGO headquarters that decide how 
processes are implemented are far away from the conflict and the local context of the 
situation. It is our opinion that local resources are not taken in to consideration to the 
degree they should. This has an effect on the incentives for the recipients of aid, who 
receives aid and who doesn’t. Consequently, aid is given is ways that could harm the private 
sector business development. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
When international assistance is given in the context of conflict, it becomes part of the 
context and thus also of the conflict (Anderson, 2008). Aid given in large amounts and over 
time could create dependency. Depending on donor assistance makes the receiving 
government vulnerable to outside political pressure, with aid being cut off (see p. 60). If 
donors cut the aid, the area depending on it could face a humanitarian crisis with a total 
collapse of the economy. To provide aid to an area in a complex emergency will be both 
problematic and difficult. Not only will you have many different actors with different 
mandates and agendas (Kruke & Olsen, 2010). In an area where you have a complex 
emergency, a collapse like this could have serious ramifications, which in turn could have an 
impact on the societal safety. The safety and security of the residents in the area could also 
be affected. 
1.1 Background 
After the Oslo accords in 1994, the occupied Palestinian Territories (oPt), received a 
significant amount of foreign aid intended to help the Palestinians develop an independent 
economy. This aid has left a widespread imprint on the Palestinian economy, and is one of 
the central factors that have influenced the economy (Hever, 2006). The assumption was 
that Israel’s eventual withdrawal from the oPt would leave the Palestinians unprepared to 
sustain themselves economically after decades of occupation. The financial aid was meant to 
make the transition from complete Israeli control to Palestinian autonomy and statehood 
easier. The aid was intended to develop an independent Palestinian economic sphere, 
without forcing the Israelis to compensate the Palestinians for damages inflicted during the 
occupation (Morli & Andrea, 2004, in Hever, 2006). 
 
The 1994 Paris Protocol on Economic Relations was signed by representatives of Israel and 
the PLO. The protocol was meant to resolve the economic issues raised by the Oslo Accords. 
The accords themselves offered a tradeoff: until a final status agreement is reached, Israel 
would control customs and trade while the Palestinians would be allowed to enter Israel and 
work there. However, after the closures that Israel imposed on the oPt, only the customs-
union remained in effect (Arnon et. al. in Hever, 2006). This limitation imposed on 
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Palestinian workers entering Israel created a serious decline in the Palestinian economy due 
to the loss of this central income source (Farsakh & Leila, in Hever, 2006). 
 
In September 2000, the second intifada broke out, and the Israeli army escalated measures 
against the Palestinians. The Palestinian economy was effectively devastated. In two years 
between September 2000 and late 2002, the GDP per-capita (the annual domestic 
production per Palestinian) dropped by over 40% (World Bank in Hever, 2006). To help the 
Palestinians survive, the amount of foreign aid funneled to the oPt was almost doubled in 
2001. Humanitarian aid grew, and the Palestinians own means for producing income 
diminished. The unemployment rate went up for two reasons. The first was the loss of jobs 
inside Israel. Between the third quarter of 2000 (just before the beginning of the second 
Intifada) and the end of 2003, the number of Palestinian workers from the West Bank 
permitted to enter and work in Israel diminished by 53%, and the number of workers from 
Gaza diminished by 86%. The second reason was the destruction of Palestinian 
infrastructure. Unemployment increased from 17% in the West Bank and 26% in Gaza prior 
to the Second Intifada to 27% and 37% at the end of 2003 (World Bank, in Hever, 2006). 
 
1.2 Aid dependency 
Palestinian Authority (PA) received net official development aid (ODA) of US$2.5 billion in 
2010, with United States, European Union, UN and Arab countries the top donors. With ODA 
accounting for some 31 % of GDP, it’s an indicator of the oPt’s reliance on external funding. 
Palestinian Authority has been one of the highest recipients of per capita foreign aid in the 
World1. Almost half of all aid in 2009 came from the two top donors – the US and EU – 
historically it has come from a larger pool of over 40 donors. Given the diverse range of 
agencies and organizations involved, the management and coordination of aid is therefore a 
significant challenge for the PA (MAS, 2011). The PA would not be able to provide basic 
functions to the Palestinian people without foreign aid. Furthermore, the PA is the biggest 
employer in the oPt; without foreign aid they would not be able to pay salaries to 
approximately 90 000 Palestinians (World Bank, 2012).  
                                                          
1 Source: http://www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/en/countries/middle-east/735.html 
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Humanitarian aid to oPt increased from US$863 million in 2008 to US$1.3 billion in 2009. 
Economists and businessmen have warned that the PA’s dependency on aid and 
vulnerability to external shocks could lead the entire West Bank economy to collapse, and 
consequently become a humanitarian crisis. Among the most vulnerable are the owners of 
small businesses and all those who depend on foreign aid through the PA (IRIN, 2012). 
 
A report to the Ad Hoc Liaison committee from the World Bank says that a robust private 
sector growth is necessary for the PA to generate the revenues needed to sustain service 
delivery. The sustainability of growth in the West Bank and Gaza depends upon increasing 
private investment, and the numbers indicates that private investment is beginning to pick 
up in certain sectors, but they are still too low to be considered as sustainable (World Bank, 
2010). The public sector and service sector is the sectors in growth (almost 40% of total 
activity). A report from the World Bank 2010 warned about the lack of productivity in private 
sector growth. As long as the private investments are low, it will not be able to replace aid as 
the driver of growth (MAS, 2010).  
 
1.3 Research Question and limitations  
This leads us to the research question; 
How does international aid affect business development in Nablus? 
In this thesis we have looked at how international aid affects business development in 
Nablus, because of the city’s previous status as economic center. Because of lack of data on 
area specific subjects we have looked at the conditions in the West Bank as a whole, which 
have an effect on business development. Gaza is not included in our thesis, because the 
situation is too different from the West Bank to be representative and comparable in our 
study; however, some statistics include numbers from Gaza as well. We have mainly focused 
on small private businesses (employees from 1 -5 persons), and how the medium and large 
businesses affect them; small businesses, because they are especially vulnerable to 
variations in the economic situation. We have not studied the public businesses, because we 
see the private sector as an important part for sustainable growth. 
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The thesis will first explain the background for the economic situation in the oPt. This is to 
give the readers an understanding of the situation today. Following the background is a 
contextual presentation of the city Nablus, which is our main focus area in this thesis.  
The main sections of the thesis, the theoretical section, the findings and the discussion will 
answer two sub-questions that both lead to the answer of our main research question.  
Part one of the thesis will focus on how budget support makes the small businesses 
vulnerable, how politics follows international aid, and how aid can make societies dependent 
and vulnerable.  The second part focuses on the accessibility of aid, how local resources are 
used in coordination and communication of aid distribution and how this affects the way aid 
is given. It will also look at how the occupation affects the business environment. 
1.5 Related Studies 
The Palestinian conflict has been going on for 60 years, and the situation is always changing. 
Numerous reports have been published over the years, but because of the sometimes very 
rapid changes, the content of these reports will not be relevant in the context of today. The 
Palestinian conflict is a well-documented conflict; the majority of recent publications, 
however, focus mainly on democracy and institution building, in our opinion.  
The World Bank recently (March 2012) published the report; Stagnation or Revival? 
Palestinian Economic Prospects. An Economic monitoring to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee. 
This report gives a thorough and up to date indication of the situation in numbers, and also a 
suggestion on how to improve the business climate. The International Monetary Fund also 
presented a similar report in March 2012, Recent Experience and Prospects of the Economy 
of the West Bank and Gaza. This report presents statistics and also gives insight into the 
current economic situation.   
  
Studies that go more specific on the issues in Palestine are; The Illusion of development 
under Israeli occupation (Ibrahim, 2011), a study of the Palestinian development situation as 
it is affected by the occupation. This book also studies and discusses the political aspects of 
aid, and how the political situation plays a big role in the motivation of donor countries. 
Hanafi & Tabar (2005), The Emergence of a Globalized Elite. Donors, International 
Organizations and Local NGOs provide insights to the Palestinian context. It looks at how 
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external actors influence Palestinian NGOs in terms of their development policies, and how 
they can Palestinian NGOs contribute to the elaboration of global agendas through 
transnational activism and global conferences2. 
The report, Study of the Economic Opportunities in Nablus Governorate and the North 
(2011), prepared by the National Expert Optimum for Consultations and Training on behalf 
of the German organization GIZ by Hilal and Shallian, discusses challenges for economic 
growth in Nablus area. The report gives a thorough study of different sectors and possible 
strategies for further development. 
 
The abovementioned literature helped us to gain insight on the topic for this thesis, as we 
did not find any research on our issue in particular. Little area-specific literature and reports 
were found on Nablus, so we had to widen our search for knowledge on the situation in the 
West Bank. As the West Bank is a very small area, we thought that reports covering the 
entire area would be useful and relevant in our research covering Nablus.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Source: http://www.palestine-studies.org/books.aspx?id=579&href=details 
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2.0 Context 
2.2. General Information  
 
2.2.1. Geography 
Figure 1: The West Bank & Gaza3 
The oPt area is split in two areas; West Bank and 
Gaza. The West Bank is an area of 5,800 sq km – 
130km long and 40 – 65km wide.  It has borders 
to Jordan and Israel.  The West Bank has an 
average elevation of 750m, but it also comprises 
Jericho and the shores of the Dead Sea which, at 
390m below sea level, forms the lowest point on 
earth. Gaza is an area of 365 sq km - some 45km 
long and 5-12km wide. West Bank and Gaza 
together is 6,165 square km4. The main language 
is Arabic but English is also widely spoken.  
The religion is Islam and a Christian minority of 
3%. The currencies used are New Israeli Shekel, 
Jordanian Dinar (only in the West Bank). Because 
of the amount of foreign aid the US Dollar is also 
used.  
2.2.2. Political groups  
The major political parties are: Fatah, Popular 
front for the liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 
Democratic front for the liberation of Palestine 
                                                          
3 Source: http://www.sdhpr.org/Countries/Palestine.html 
4 Source: http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-
country/country-profile/middle-east-north-africa/palestine-national-authority?profile=all 
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(DFLP), Palestinian Democratic Union (FIDA), and Hamas (all except Hamas are members of 
the PLO). The Palestinian Legislative Council has 88 elected members. The President is 
Mahmoud Abbas, and the Prime Minister is Dr Salam Fayyad.  
2.2.3. Population 
Numbers for The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics show that there are 11.22 million 
Palestinians. 4.23 million in the Palestinian Territories, 1.37 million in Israel, 4.99 millions in 
Arab countries and 636 thousand in other countries. There are 2.6 million in the West Bank 
and 1.6 million in the Gaza Strip. Of every 100 persons in the Palestinian Territories, about 
44 are refugees: 42 per 100 in the West Bank and 58 per 100 in the Gaza Strip. The average 
household size in the oPt is 5.8 persons in 20115. The population of the Palestinian territory 
is a young population; the percentage of individuals aged (0-14) constituted 41% of the total 
population at mid-2011 of which 39% in West Bank and 44% in Gaza Strip. The elderly 
population aged (65 years and over) constituted 3% of the total population of which 3% in 
the West Bank and 2% in Gaza Strip of mid-2011. Population density of The Palestinian 
territory is generally high at 693 persons/km particularly in Gaza Strip is 4,353 persons/km 
compared to lower population density in West Bank at 456 persons/km at mid-20116.  
2.2.4. Employment  
The Participation rate in labor force in 2011 increased to 43% compared with 41% in 2010. 
This increase in the participation rate is attributed to the increase in the size of the labor 
force that entered into the labor market. In 2011, the number of employees increased by 
13% compared with 2010, as the number of employees in the Palestinian Territory reached 
837 000 employees in 2011 compared to 744 000 employees in 2010. As a result, the 
unemployment rate in the Palestinian Territory decreased to 21% in 2011 compared with 
24% in 2010 (PSCB, 2011a).  
 
2.3 The Economic Situation for oPt 
In 2011, gross domestic revenues were at NIS2.6 billion. The 2011 budget called for domestic 
revenues to grow by almost 11 %, but they fell by 3 %. Domestic tax collections were 
                                                          
5 Source:http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/palestineEnd2011E.pdf 
6Source:http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/DesktopModules/Articles/ArticlesView.aspx?tabID=0&lang
=en&ItemID=1841&mid=12235 
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projected to grow by 11 % in 2011. The income tax collections were lower by almost 9 % 
(World Bank, 2012). Value-added tax (VAT) collections increased by 6 %, and property tax 
receipts fell by almost 12 %. The biggest shortfall in domestic revenues was in non-tax 
revenues which were 18 % lower than budget projections and 9 % less than 2010 (Ibid). 
Clearance revenues totaled NIS 5.1 billion, 4 % below their 2011 budget target, but 9 % 
higher than 2010. When compared to 2010, customs and VAT receipts grew by 11% and 14% 
respectively. In May and November 2011, the GoI temporarily suspended the transfer of 
clearance revenues. Since clearance revenues account for over two thirds of total PA 
revenues and finance around 43 % of spending, the suspension greatly exacerbated the PA’s 
fiscal crisis at the end of the year (Ibid). In 2010, 26 % of the population in the oPt lived in 
poverty, while 14% suffered from deep poverty7  (PCBS, 2011a).  
 
2.3.1. Budget Support  
In 2011, the PA required about US$1.5 billion dollars in budget support, of which US$200 
million to cover development expenses not funded directly by donors. However, it only 
received about US$814 million in budget support and US$169 million in development 
financing, for a total of US$983 million. The PA financed this gap by borrowing from the 
Palestinian banking sector and accumulating around US$260 million in arrears to the private 
sector. It is unlikely that the banks and the private sector will allow the PA to continue to 
borrow so heavily (World Bank, 2012).  
 
2.3.2. Trade  
Current account deficit in the Palestinian Territory increased during 2011 reaching USD 
1,894.4 million which is the highest since 2000. Such deficit is attributed to the steady rise in 
the value of imports of goods and services to the oPt; while the Palestinian exports remained 
in its normal level which in return increased the trade balance deficit by 9.2% compared with 
2010 (PCBS, 2011a).    
 
                                                          
7 As defined by the Ministry of Health, Annual report 2005-2010, Nablus: Palestine 
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2.4 Nablus Governorate 
2.4.1 General  
The governorate of Nablus is located in the northern half of Palestine and the West Bank. It 
lies south of Jenin and Tubas Governorates and north of Salfit and Ramallah/Al-Bireh 
Governorates, and west of Tulkarem and Qalqilya governorates. Nablus city is surrounded by 
mountains on all sides.  The Governorate of Nablus is 605 square-kilometers (10% of 
Palestinian territories and 10.7 of the West-Bank area).   
Figure 2: Nablus Governorate8 
The population of Nablus Governorate was 348,023 in 2010 (PCBS, 2011b). The city of 
Nablus and neighboring communities represent 
57 % of the total governorate population. The 
rural areas are home to about 33.5 % of the 
population. The governorates three refugee 
camps represent 9.5 % of the population (Ibid), 
but refugees in total for Nablus governorate is 
83 115. Nablus has 61 localities, in addition to 
the three refugee camps: Balata, Asker and Ein 
Elma. According to the ministry of Local 
Government the governorate is home to 59 
localities: 9 municipal councils, 41 village 
councils, and 9 project committees. There are 
also 9 joint service councils in the governorate 
(Ibid). 
 
Nablus City, is the largest Palestinian city in the West Bank. The Nablus old city has one of 
the oldest souks (covered markets) in the West Bank. It is one of the most important cities 
for trade, industry and education in the occupied oPt. The city’s population is predominantly 
Muslim, with Christian and Samaritan minorities. The poverty rate in Nablus governorate 
(2010) was 11 %. The level of deep poverty was at 6 % in 2010 (PCBS, 2011b). 
                                                          
8 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Nablus_in_Palestine.svg 
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Labor Force 
The results of the Labor Force Survey for the governorate of Nablus in 2009 for individuals 
who are classified within the working age (aged 15 years and over) that the rate of labor 
force participation among them amounted to 42% in 2009. The percentage of workers of the 
total participants in the labor force reached to 87% of whom 3% employment is limited. 
Results also indicate that the percentage of unemployed among the participants in the labor 
force reached 13%, which is less than the average for the West Bank as a whole. As for 
academic achievement, the ratio of individuals (15 years and more) who have completed 
undergraduate and graduate university education was 9 % in 2008 (Hilal & Shalian, 2011). 
2.4.2 Business environment in Nablus 
There are 14,600 enterprises in Nablus governorate (Ibid). Most operate in the production 
sector by producing consumer products, such as foods and beverages, footwear, leather, 
clothing, metals and furniture. The establishments operating in the private sector in Nablus 
constitute 93% of the total number of establishments operating in the district, 90% employ 
Source: PCBS, 2011b  
Table 1: Number of establishments in Operation in the Private Sector, Non-Governmental 
Organization Sector and Government Companies in Nablus Governorate by Main 
Economic Activity and Number of Employed Persons, 2009 
Economic Activity No. of Employed Persons No. of Establishments 
Agriculture (raising of cattle and 
other animals) 
2,412 973 
Mining & quarrying 321 67 
Manufacturing 9,393 2,278 
Electricity and water supply 24 7 
Construction 808 73 
Wholesale, retail trade & repairs 13,235 7,239 
Transport, storage 
&communications 
2,326 103 
Financial intermediation 859 125 
Real estate, renting & business 
activities 
1,153 484 
Education  
3,068 
235 
Health & social work 1,606 490 
Other community, social & 
personal services 
1,980 987 
Total 38,524 13,742 
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less than 5 people (Ibid). The most important industries in Nablus are; metal industry, 
manufacture of furniture, food production, clothing, and paper industries, printing and 
publishing. Nablus employs 32 per cent of its manpower in the district. The industrial and 
commercial sector is the strongest in the governorate. In addition the agriculture sector has 
experienced a growth the last years. The number of agricultural establishments rose to 55 in 
1997 and to 973 in 2007 (Ibid). 
 
Nablus is known for its position as the economic capital of Palestine. The district tops the 
Palestinian industrial sectors in terms of production and numbers of establishments. 
Moreover, Nablus is considered an important commercial center in the northern part of the 
West Bank. Approximately 7200 economic establishments in Nablus work in the spheres of 
retail, wholesale business, vehicle reparation, and 2300 establishments work in 
manufacturing (Hilal &Shallian, 2011).  
2.4.3 Import/Export 
In 2007 the district of Nablus and Salfit was US$ 108.3 million, 26.5 % of the total amount of 
import in oPt. The value of exports in the two districts reached US$65.9m. Nablus and Salfit 
was US$13.3 million. 20.2 % of the total value of exports in the West Bank.  
 
 
Table 2: Value of registered imports and exports by SITC-3 Categories in Nablus & Salfit 
governorate 2005-2009. SITC = Standard International Trade Classification, Rev.3 
 
Section The Value, in 1000 US$ 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Imports      
Food and live animals 54,853.5 56,367.5 78,086.8 77,622.7 96,709.4 
Beverages and tobacco 20,034.3 27,833.3 21,984.5 29,499.7 35,867.6 
Raw materials, inedible except 
fuels 
7,094.2 7,686.4 8,116.8 6,871.5 13,758.6 
Mineral Fuels, Lubricants and 
related material 
72,316.9 91,920.9 108,256.7 166,117.1 123.089.9 
Animal and vegetable oils, fats 
and waxes  
9,441.8 8,884.0 7,347.6 6,808.9 6,310.3 
Chemical and related products 
n.e.s.* 
27,352.0 28,031.0 35,437.6 33.003.4 39,644.3 
Manufactured goods classified 
mainly by material 
48,669.9 42,560.9 55,685.9 65,939.7 86,571.7 
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Machinery and transport 
equipment’s 
47,259.0 39,350.0 59,187.4 40,836.8 78,604.3 
Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles 
21,499.7 22,488.5 34,669.9 27,073.9 35,562.8 
Commodities and transactions 
n.e.s* In the sitc-Rev.3 
8,503.9 14,362.1    
Total Imports 317,025.2 339,484.6 408,773.2 453,773.2 516,118.9 
 
Section The Value, in 1000 US$ 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Exports      
Food and live animals 6,489.7 5,685.6 10,533.3 18,268.8 15,069.9 
Beverages and tobacco 6,641.2 5,036.7 8,764.8 13,306.5 14,934.9 
Raw materials, inedible except 
fuels 
157.5 493.6 1,418.6 2,488.0 6,537.5 
Mineral Fuels, Lubricants and 
related material 
1.4 34.0 5.7 83.9 8.3 
Animal and vegetable oils, fats 
and waxes  
4,233.8 5,569.4 5,556.5 10,115.4 7,399.1 
Chemical and related products 
n.e.s.* 
5,450.9 4,839.5 7,730.3 7,293.5 4,599.2 
Manufactured goods classified 
mainly by material 
6,614.3 6,855.6 12,067.9 20,589.3 15,134.6 
Machinery and transport 
equipment’s 
3,090.7 2,970.8 4,475.6 5,143.4 5,899.2 
Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles 
3,090.7 2,970.8 4,475.6 5,143.4 5,899.2 
Commodities and transactions 
n.e.s* In the sitc-Rev.3 
8.0     
Total Imports 41,795.0 41,583.6 65,892.4 95,776.1 90,744.3 
*n.e.s not elsewhere specified 
Source: PCBS,2011b 
2.4.4 Nablus and the Occupation  
Nablus was hit hard by the Israeli defense force (IDF) in the second intifada. Nablus city was 
surrounded by seven checkpoints on all sides of the city, the governorate had 106 
checkpoints. The city was also under curfew. From 2001 until 2007 the city had been under 
curfew for 312 days and from 2002 until 2007 there were 255 days were the city was under 
closure. This was especially strict compared to the rest of the West Bank. Freedom of 
movement was non-existing. This was hard for the businesses in Nablus and the city was 
moving towards poverty (Ma’an, 2008). In the last years, some of the restrictions have been 
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eased, so the business environment is also doing better. Today, 2012, Nablus district  has 6 
checkpoints, three partial checkpoints, 33 earth mounds blocking exit roads from major 
thoroughfares, eight roadblocks 5,4 km of trenches and 3,4 km of earth walls preventing free 
movement (Ibid). Nablus governorate has 11 settlements with 11900 settlers living in the 
area (PCBS, 2011a). 
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3.0 Theory  
 
3.1 Development  
The meaning of the term development varies and has been discussed abundantly. 
Development can be a number of things, all depending on what type, aspect or field of 
development we are talking about; that being political -, environmental- , economic- , 
human- or cultural – development to name a few. Based on an economic term; 
“development has traditionally meant the capacity of a national economy, whose initial 
economic condition has been more or less static for a long time, to generate and sustain an 
annual increase in its gross national income (GNI) at rates of 5% to 7% or more” (Todaro & 
Smith, p.14). Economic development can also be defined in terms of indicators in GDP, 
which is a common way to describe the term (Ibrahim, 2011). There is no unified definition 
of development; one major characteristic, however, is that it measures a progress or 
process, hopefully moving forward in a positive direction, compared to a previous situation 
or baseline at a given point in time. 
The aspect of freedom is also discussed by the well-known economist and Nobel Prize 
winner Amartya Sen; “Development requires the removal of major sources of un-freedom: 
poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social 
deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance and over-activity of repressive 
states” (Sen, p.3). Sen has been quoted in many articles about development, and the 
thought of freedom is used as a key component in the process of achieving this. He also talks 
about market mechanisms as a mean to economic growth, this however, is not as important 
as freedom; “Economic growth cannot sensibly be treated as an end in itself. Development 
has to be more concerned with enhancing the lives we lead and the freedoms we enjoy” 
(Sen, p.14). He also believes that the development process must happen from within a 
society, not from the outside. The aspect of freedom is also repeated in this definition of 
human development; “Human development is about putting people at the centre of 
development. It is about people realizing their potential, increasing their choices and 
enjoying the freedom to lead lives they value” (OPHI, p.3). 
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Development happens on both a physical and a mental level, where society aims for a better 
life. Based on this Todaro & Smith, 2009, p.22, presents three objectives, that a developing 
society must have; 
1. To increase the availability and widen the distribution of basic life-sustaining goods 
such as food, shelter health and protection.  
2. To raise levels of living, including, in addition to higher incomes, the provision of 
more jobs, better education, and greater attention to cultural and human values, all 
of which will serve not only to enhance material well-being but also to generate 
greater individual and national self-esteem.  
3. To expand the range of economic and social choices available to individuals and 
nations by freeing them from servitude and dependence not only in relation to other 
people and nation-states but also to the forces of ignorance and human misery. 
The objectives of development according to Ibrahim (2011) are; 
- The objectives of development aim to achieve and sustain high rates of economic 
growth. 
- The objectives of development aim to expand what people are able to do and be – 
what might be called their freedom.   
Skarstein (1997) debates in his book on development theory, the aspects of dependency, 
where it’s argued that “foreign direct investments in the periphery will increase its 
dependency upon the centre” (p.44), where the periphery in our case will be oPT, and the 
centre- foreign donors. Furthermore, however, “the periphery’s increasing dependency on 
the centre will imply a problem of increasing impoverishment or underdevelopment at the 
periphery” (Skarstein, p.44). 
 
3.2 Relief vs. Development 
Where relief ends and development starts, is an ongoing debate. It will go on as long as 
there are no clear guidelines for the one or the other. Concerning to the oPt, Hanafi &Tabar 
discusses the dilemma where the crisis in Palestine was considered to be over, and 
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development was to take place.  The authors claim that the conflict was not in fact over, 
how does one proceed in a situation like this?  
“Jones identifies four factors that complicate the debate:  
- technical issues – donors have very rigid administrative distinctions between relief 
and development budgets, which make it difficult to respond quickly or to coordinate 
both types of aid;  
- conceptual issues – often development agents prioritize long-term initiatives and 
focus on state cooperation, which is not the case with humanitarian relief agencies;  
- coordination issues – both development and humanitarian aid; and the political 
question – the possibility that the donor is unwilling to support a particular political 
regime”. 
 (Jones 2000, p. 9-18, in Hanafi & Tabar, p.47). 
In complex emergencies there is a matter of time aspects, short vs long term, where on one 
side it’s important to focus on the ongoing crisis, but at the same time begin with repairs and 
building the society back up. In such emergencies it is also possible that relief work and 
development goes hand in hand, happening at the same time, but in different sectors, and at 
different levels. In some cases NGOs “represent more effective, efficient, and less costly 
service-providers than governments; at the same time they are perceived as having closer 
access to marginalized groups” (Hanafi & Tabar, p.38). NGOs work as vehicles for 
democratization and essential components of civil society; “today NGOs deliver more official 
development assistance than the entire United Nations system” (Ibid). 
3.3 Aid and economy  
“Economics have defined foreign aid, …, as any flow of capital to less developed countries 
(LDCs) that meets two criteria: (1) Its objective should be noncommercial from the point of 
view of the donor, and (2) it should be characterized by concessional terms; that is, the 
interest rate and repayment period for borrowed capital should be softer (less stringent) 
than commercial terms” (Todaro & Smith, p.729). This does not include the aspects of 
military aid, which is normally excluded from international economic measurements. 
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How aid is given, and the donations distributed varies according to the situation in donating 
countries. In times of economic crisis the money donated reflects the current situation and 
vice versa in good economic times. Recent findings (Hanafi &Tabar, p. 47-48) show that 
there are three trends among donor disbursement of aid;  
- Overall reduction of aid due to the adjustments of fiscal policies in developed 
countries 
- Proportional increase in short-term relief aid at the expense of long-term 
development cooperation 
- The donors usually switch to multilateral channels when political conflict gives way to 
peace and reconstruction 
3.3.1 Aid and politics 
In oPt, aid is political money. In an area that is so heavily affected by political decisions, it is 
impossible to get away from the political aspect, and this in turn lays the ground for 
decisions regarding the distribution of aid. “Donor-country governments give aid primarily 
because it is in their political, strategic, or economic self-interest to do so” (Todaro & Smith, 
p. 731). There are, however, organizations that genuinely want to help, but to what extent 
they do this can be debated; “Some development assistance may be motivated by moral and 
humanitarian desires to assist the less fortunate (e.g., emergency food relief and medical 
programs), but there is no historical evidence to suggest that over longer periods of time, 
donor nations assist others without expecting some corresponding benefits (political, 
economic, military, counterterrorism, antinarcotics, etc.) in return” (Ibid). 
The numbers show that the allocation of foreign aid is only secondarily determined by the 
relative needs of developing countries. Most bilateral aid seems unrelated to development 
priorities, being based largely on political and military considerations and the whims and ad 
hoc judgments of donor decision makers. Multilateral aid (e.g. from the World Bank and 
various UN agencies) is somewhat more economically rational, although here too, the rich 
seem to attract more resources than the poor (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). 
There are many examples of donor countries blocking aid to regimes they don’t agree 
political with. This can lead to a poor monitoring of a potential crisis situations, something 
that would not be acceptable in most contexts. Examples of this are North Korea, Liberia and 
27 
 
Afghanistan. There are also examples of the opposite; aid can serve as a substitute for 
diplomatic efforts (Keen, 2008).  
Alesina and Dollar (2000) argues in the paper “Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?” 
that foreign aid has only been partially successful at promoting growth and reducing 
poverty. They have two explanations for this. One is the poor performance of the 
bureaucracies of the receiving countries and the other is the pattern of the flow of foreign 
aid. They document in their paper that there are different motives for giving foreign aid. The 
allocation of bilateral aid across recipient countries provides evidence as to why it is not 
more effective at promoting growth and poverty reduction. Factors such as colonial past and 
voting patterns in the United Nations explain more of the distribution of aid than the 
political institutions or economic policy of recipients. The authors findings show that non-
democratic former colony get about twice as much aid as a democratic non-colony. A similar 
result holds for former colonies that are closed to trade versus open non-colonies.  
The three donors, France, Japan and USA have different patterns of how they distributed 
aid. USA has targeted about one third of its total assistance to Egypt and Israel; France has 
given overwhelmingly to its former colonies; and Japans aid is highly correlated with UN 
voting patterns (countries that vote tandem with Japan receive more assistance). A country 
that is relative democratic receives 39% more aid; a country that has a relatively long 
colonial past receives 87% more aid, a country that voted relatively often with Japan in the 
UN receives 172% more aid. Egypt and Israel receives much more aid than other countries 
with similar characteristics. Egypt receives 481% more aid. Israel is a relatively rich country 
with no colonial past. The authors write that according to the regression Israel shouldn’t 
receive aid; instead they receive 400$ per capita. These results suggest that, in explaining aid 
flows; political and strategic considerations are at least as important, and arguably more 
important, than recipient’s policy or political institutions (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). 
These countries aid allocation may be very effective at promoting strategic interests, but the 
result is that bilateral aid has only a weak association with poverty, democracy, and good 
policy (Ibid).  
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3.4 Local structures/ dynamics  
How aid is distributed and in which manner the aid workers behave will decide the impact, 
both the positive and negative (Anderson, 2008). You get a flow of capital that has 
consequences. It can affect the economy, the conflict, and the local power balance. In a 
complex emergency there will be many different actors with different agendas and 
mandates. Anderson (2008) stresses the need for providers of aid to be aware of the 
consequences of their actions when working in war areas. This thesis will use the term 
conflict and not war.  
Examples of actions or non-actions that can leave negative effects on communities;  
 Conflict through implicit ethical messages 
o Arms and power 
 When aid agencies hire armed guards and drive with protected cars 
the implicit message can be that they are afraid of the people they are 
supposed to help. They divide themselves from the beneficiaries.  
o Disrespect, mistrust, and competition among aid agencies. 
o Different Values for different Lives 
 There are often different salary policies for international workers and 
for local workers. This can leave the message that the international 
workers are more worth then the locals. (Anderson, 2008). 
 
3.4.1 How aid affects local structures   
Aid often creates its own “industries” in recipient countries in which profits can be made and 
wages can be paid (Ibid). Demands for others assets also rise when aid agencies arrive. The 
cost of hotel rooms, office space, housing, food furniture, and equipment are bid up by the 
influx of expatriates. People who own or control these facilities and goods can become 
wealthy in the midst of the otherwise deteriorating economic conditions associated with 
conflict. Aid creates jobs, pays wages (Ibid), and can create sectors that would not be 
present if not for the conflict situation. Aid agencies hire local people who speak the 
languages; they also hire drivers, housekeepers, guards, gardeners, and warehouses. If the 
demand for limited skills is sufficient, wages can be significantly inflated by the presence of 
international employers (Ibid).  
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3.5 Accessibility of aid 
3.5.1 Coordination and communication in aid distribution 
This sub chapter will use theory of organizational accidents to explain why coordination 
between the different actors can be a challenge in complex emergencies.  
Coordination in a complex emergency 
The success of humanitarian operations depends on the ability of organizations to work 
together (Kruke & Olsen, 2010). In complex emergencies there are is a large number of 
different actors with different mandates and agendas. This can make coordination difficult 
(Ibid). UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs defines a complex emergency 
as”...a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable 
breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an 
international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/ 
or the on-going United Nations country Program” (IASC,1994, in Kruke & Olsen, 2010, p. 3). 
This definition takes in to account that you need a coordinated response between host 
government, humanitarian organizations and society (Kruke & Olsen, 2010).   
Accidents represent a significant disturbance or collapse of existing beliefs, norms about 
threats and how to handle them. This will not happen if the gap between how you thought 
the organization worked and how it actually worked did not exist (Dekker & Suparamaniam, 
2005). HQ and donors are often far away from the conflict and don’t know the facts on the 
ground, the blunt end being HQ/donors. Issues can often be black and white for HQ/donors, 
they are engaged with issues such as economy and politics, while field workers, as the sharp 
end, are engaged with issues of what is needed on the ground (Ibid). In our thesis local 
NGO’s and beneficiaries will also represent the sharp end. This makes it hard for field 
workers to communicate the complexity of the situation. 
When decisions are being made by HQ/donors, it is often guided by strict procedure, 
protocol, over specified plans, politics, economy, hierarchy and organizational structures. 
However, when field workers on the ground make their decisions, they work is based on 
managing surprise, resource shortage, what is needed in the moment, and capitalizing on 
local political opportunity (Kruke & Olsen, 2010). These two different ways of working makes 
coordination and communication difficult. HQ/donors and field workers speak different 
languages, and a gap between knowledge and authority is created. It is a paradox that those 
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who have knowledge of what to do, do not have the authority to take decisions, and those 
who have no knowledge of what is needed on the ground are authorized to decide (Kruke & 
Olsen, 2010; Dekker & Suparamaniam, 2005). This makes it difficult for team leaders to deal 
with rules and protocol. Knowledge and authority are rarely located in the same actor. It’s 
difficult to have the knowledge, understand the facts on the ground and still be political and 
bureaucratically accountable. Crisis management is not just about providing local assistance 
but also geopolitics. Giving, not give, accept or refuse help, is politics. Field workers are not 
trained to look locally, too internationally, or see all the stakeholders in the hierarchy 
(Dekker & Suparamaniam, 2005). 
The larger the gap between the world as imagined and the world as it is, the more 
vulnerable the organization is, because the gap opens up for unintended and complex 
interactions between contributory preconditions (Dekker & Suparamaniam, 2005). This can 
result in what Reason (1997) refers to as organizational accidents. 
 
3.5.2 The challenges of impact assessments and evaluations in aid distribution 
 “Like all humanitarian evaluations, impact assessments predominantly relate to two 
institutional priorities: accountability and learning” (ALNAP, 2009, p.13). As with many other 
aspects of humanitarian and development work the terms and definitions are not fully 
recognized and agreed upon, that goes for impact assessment as well. “Generally, the aim is 
to judge the likely environmental, social and economic consequences of development 
projects” (Hofmann, Roberts, Shoham & Harvey, 2004, p.8). The concern is to identify 
potential negative impacts, and establish a valid counterfactual – what would happen if the 
intervention had not taken place (White, 2005; Hofman et al., 2004). (Assessments and 
evaluations can also be used as documentation.)  
Kaiser argues that “… humanitarian actors are beginning to recognize that assessing the 
actual impact of their work is more valid than simply measuring output in material terms” 
(Kaiser, 2004, p.8). This means that evaluators need to look at participants, and conduct 
beneficiary based evaluations. They need to be interested in looking into, and understand 
the nature of the situation as the social actors experience it. It is important to not only see 
the cause and effect, but also understand why it happens.  
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NGOs see the value of participation, and the necessity to involve participants and 
beneficiaries in assessments and evaluations. The perspectives from beneficiaries is 
something to value, the “…wisdom and judgement of ordinary people is therefore a critical 
element of any impact assessment process” (Roche, p. 29). The challenge, because of this is 
to incorporate these opinions into monitoring and evaluation systems. It is also important 
not to focus entirely on either positive or negative changes, both aspects need to be 
balanced. The degree to which this is done does not match the perceived impression of the 
importance of actually doing it, thus creating a gap between theory and practice (Kaiser, 
2004; Jones 2000; Roche, 1999; Hanafi & Tabar, 2005).  A different gap is the one between 
the uses of evaluations at all; “Impact is a key evaluation criteria, and most evaluations of 
humanitarian programmes consider it. In practice, however, assessment of impact within 
evaluations has often been poor” (ALNAP; 2003b, in Hofmann et. Al., 2004, p. 8). Eventually 
results need to be presented, and it is not easy to give clear cut numbers and results based 
on this type of assessments.  
 
The difficulties with evaluation:  
What use is evaluating if there is nothing learned from it? As Hanafi and Tabar (p. 183-184) 
remarks in their study; “… upon close inspection we found that community participation is 
often used as a slogan: it is discussed as a method, but when probed as to how it’s applied, 
there is little substance behind the celebratory proclamation…“ It is also quite clear that 
donors appreciate results, and because of this NGOs often evaluate outputs of projects in a 
manner that pleases the donor. There is a chance that true findings are kept unnoticed and 
undisclosed because they are found uninteresting for the donor, by those evaluating. Too 
much is expected by too many different stakeholders (ALNAP, 2009).  
The way evaluations are conducted could predetermine the information gathered. The point 
of evaluations and assessments is to learn, for the donors perhaps more to see results, but 
also the aspect of accountability. Currently accountability is faced upwards; to donors, 
trustees and other stakeholders, when in fact it should be downward, to those receiving 
assistance (Kaiser, 2004). There is a connection between the information sought in an 
evaluation and the means and methods used to gather it (Ibid). 
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Another difficulty with evaluations is what can be read into them. Like statistics, evaluations 
can also be conducted in such a manner that it displays the results you like to portrait, which 
in term could result in a false image of reality. “Evaluation is a political process which means 
different things to different actors” (Ibid). Field staff and evaluators should be obliged to 
take responsibility for their work no matter what, and accountability and transparency 
should go hand in hand (Ibid).  
Impact assessment methods and results differ between organizations. It is therefore hard to 
measure impact, because there is no final answer as to what indicators or aspects of the 
impact are the correct ones. There is also the question of what method to use. Donors tend 
to favor quantitative methods, because they give clear indications of the results, whereas 
more qualitative methods are seen as more uncertain. The main priorities that seem to be 
consistent throughout the organizations, however, are learning and accountability (Kaiser, 
2004; Roche, 1999; ALNAP, 2009).  
 
3.6 Summary 
The development theory show how economic growth cannot be treated as an end in itself, 
but we also need to focus on “enhancing the lives we lead and the freedoms we enjoy” (Sen, 
p.14), this meaning that statistics are not necessarily enough to thoroughly describe the 
aspects of the development progress.  
In complex emergences there are a number of different actors with different mandates and 
agendas. Donors have their own agenda and reasons for providing aid, and do it primarily 
because it is in their political, strategic, or economic self-interest (Todaro & Smith, 2009). 
The political aspects of aid are of great importance in this thesis, because of the political 
situation in the Palestinian area, also highlighting the features of aid dependency.  
How aid is given impacts the local society, in complex emergences HQ and donors are 
distanced from the conflict and don’t necessarily know the facts on the ground. 
Communication and coordination are important in the functioning of aid processes, which 
again could determine the degree of local resource participation. How coordination and 
communication structures affect the distribution of aid is something that we wish to 
highlight in our thesis, because of its relevance in developing the business environment.   
33 
 
Based on these theoretical aspects, our research question is;  
How does international aid affect business development in Nablus? 
With the following sub questions:  
1. How does PA’s budged support in Nablus affect the private business sector? 
2. How are local resources used in aid distribution in private sector development? 
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4.0 Methodology 
This chapter presents the course of action and the selected tools used to describe and 
achieve new knowledge on the topic of how international aid affects business development.  
The chapter will account for and explain the research design. It will present the reasons for 
choosing a case study approach and for using qualitative methods. It will also elaborate on 
the reasons for the different qualitative methods used, strengths and weaknesses, and 
challenges involved with validity and reliability.  
4.1 Research Design  
There are several different meanings to the concept of ‘research design’. According to Yin, 
“the design is the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study’s initial 
research questions and, ultimately, to its conclusions” (Yin, 2009, p.26). The research design 
functions like a logical plan for getting from here to there, from a set of questions to be 
answered to a set of conclusions to these questions (Yin, 2009). A research design is 
normally based on answering three basic questions: What will be studied, why will it be 
studied, and how will it be studied? (Blaikie, 2009). 
 
Regarding the primary focus of our research, what to study, we wanted to study the effects 
that international aid has on business development in conflict areas. Why this theme was 
chosen was due to personal interest in the subject, and review of several reports on 
international aid. How aid makes countries dependent on foreign aid, and vulnerable to 
outside pressure, which in turn makes predictability for small businesses difficult, was an 
interesting angle to the conflict in Palestine. This also made us curious to investigate further. 
How, was through a period of fieldwork in oPt, in addition to literature studies. In our 
opinion the research we have conducted is closest to an exploratory research strategy. 
“Ideally, designing social research is the process of making all decisions related to the 
research project before they are carried out” (Blaikie, p.15), however, all eventualities and 
aspects cannot be anticipated and controlled at all times (Blaikie, 2009). This is something 
we experienced when conducting our fieldwork. The interview situations could divert from 
what is anticipated; different people make different interview subjects and therefore cannot 
be controlled. 
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The table shows the main steps taken during the working process, based on the decisions 
made regarding research design. 
Table 3: Research progress 
Period What Why  Outcome 
Period 1 
Autumn/Winter 
2011 
Literature studies. 
Contact with some 
organizations.  
Gain knowledge on 
the chosen topic and 
examine the relevance 
of the topic. 
Enhanced knowledge 
and an overview of the 
current economic 
situation in oPt. 
 
Positive feedback and 
relevance of chosen 
topic. 
Period 2 
Jan 2012 
Develop a research 
proposal, with 
research question 
and clear objectives. 
 
Approach The Nablus 
committee in 
Stavanger to get 
relevant contacts in 
Nablus.    
 
Develop a theoretical 
overview and 
interview guide. 
 
Preparation for 
fieldwork through 
literature studies. 
Present a description 
of the project to 
potential relevant 
actors in the field. 
 
To gain access to the 
field. 
 
 
 
 
To establish a clear 
direction for the field 
study. 
 
To gain a better 
overview of the field. 
A structured research 
proposal. 
 
 
 
Gained access to key 
informants in Nablus.  
 
 
 
 
A theoretical 
perspective and 
interview guide. 
 
Enhanced knowledge 
about the region. 
Period 3 
1. Feb – 6. March 
Data collection 
through field work. 
Produce findings tied 
to the research 
question. 
 
 
18 interviews 
Observations 
Questionnaire  
  
Period 4 
7. March – 15. 
July 
Data decomposing 
and analysis. 
To reduce complexity 
of the data to gain a 
better overview, and 
analyze the data in 
order to draw 
conclusions to the 
research question. 
Produce knowledge on 
the phenomena 
investigated in this 
research. 
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Period 1 
Literature studies were our main activity this period, to gain an insight as to how the 
situation in Palestine was. We wanted to get an overview of different actors in the area, 
what NGOs that were active, and who the major donors were. Further we contacted 
different organizations that we thought could have some input on business development, to 
gain insight to the relevance of our subject. As the response was positive we began 
developing our research proposal.  
Period 2 
The second period consisted mainly of further information gathering together with 
developing our research proposal. With objectives more clarified we formulated the 
research question, and approached the Nablus committee in Stavanger to get contacts, as 
we had narrowed down our research to focus on this West Bank city. We developed a 
theoretical overview, and based on the aim we wanted to pursue created an interview guide 
that was compatible for relevant informants. As a preparation for our fieldwork we sought to 
gain a better understanding of the field we were entering and explored relevant literature to 
retrieve this knowledge. 
Period 3 
This period consisted of our fieldwork on the West Bank. During this time we collected large 
amounts of data through interviews, constant observations of daily activities, and our 
questionnaire and by visiting the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. When data was not 
gathered, time was spent transcribing interviews and getting to know the area that we were 
now a part of.  
Period 4 
In this period our main focus was to decompose and analyze data in a relevant order. As we 
had collected a large amount of data the categorizing of our findings and decisions regarding 
the importance and relevance of different data was a complex and time consuming task.  
The analysis process was twofold, where we first categorized our data from the transcribed 
interviews and sorted the information into themes and where we felt they belonged. We 
also needed to summarize and quantify the information that was retrieved through the 
questionnaire. “The first and foremost strategy is to follow the theoretical propositions that 
lead to your case study” (Yin, p.130). With this in mind, we used the data together with our 
37 
 
chosen theoretic material to answer our research question, the two sub-questions, and 
come up with a conclusion as to what our findings truly were.  
 
4.2 Fieldwork 
Our fieldwork period was 5 weeks. We had discussed with other students that had also 
conducted fieldwork, and they recommended leaving as soon as possible, because the 
analysis and further work on the data would take time. The planning of our fieldwork started 
in December with us contacting different organizations. More detailed planning took place in 
January; practical issues like a place to stay were easily taken care of.  
We arranged meetings with a few people before we arrived in Palestine, but from the time 
of arrival we took use of the snowball method, and spoke to people we were recommended 
to speak to during our conducted interviews. We also sought people that seemed of interest 
to us, and got a hold of them while we were there. It was easier to get in touch with people 
when we were in the same country, as opposed to writing emails from home. We feel that 
we spoke to the right people in the beginning, as we were able to retrieve a large amount of 
information in a short period of time. After returning to Norway, we have kept in touch with 
some of our informants from small businesses, as it was our impression that circumstances 
changed fast, and the situation for the shops could change rapidly. 
Being two people doing fieldwork together was good and in our opinion something of great 
value. It was an opportunity for us to have discussions with someone in the same situation 
during our stay and solve problems together, also as a means of debriefing and venting all 
the impressions that we got. The teamwork was also impeccable, and we felt we worked 
well together.  
4.3 Methods for gathering qualitative data 
In this study, the methods for gathering qualitative data were based on literature studies, 
observations, semi-structured interviews, and a questionnaire. To get greater validity and 
also a better understanding of the subject we decided to approach the topic from different 
angles.   
 
38 
 
4.3.1 Case study  
With the decision of conducting fieldwork in oPt it became natural to design the research as 
a case study. A case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 2003, in Blakie, p. 189).  
 
Yin (2004) divides case study into ‘holistic’ and ‘embedded’ designs, and these can be either 
single-case or multiple-case designs. A holistic case study investigates only one unit of 
analysis within the case or cases, while an embedded design investigates a sub-unit or a 
number of sub-units. In our thesis we have looked into how international aid affects business 
development in Nablus, a single-case design, with a use of the embedded approach. The 
case study has an embedded approach because of the different units we have researched to 
get an impression of the different actors that affect business development. The units that 
have been researched further are INGOs, PNGOs, donors, businesses and the government. 
The units range from small local businesses to complex organizations, leaving a varied 
sample.  
 
A research design based on a case study has a particular strength in its ability to deal with a 
full variety of data, documents, interviews and observations to artifacts (Yin, 2009). This 
influenced the choices of methods for gathering data for the research. Qualitative methods 
for gathering data are also relevant when studying complex phenomena (Hellevik, 1995). 
International aid is a complicated subject with different views and politics, which can make 
collecting data difficult. To better be able to study the topic in depth, the thesis is based on a 
qualitative method.   
 
4.3.2 Literature Study  
The method of literature study relies on secondary data, data that others have collected. 
Examples are public documents, reports, and letters (Jacobsen, 2005). The method of 
literature studies were an important tool to increasing our knowledge on the topic of 
international aid and business development. By gaining knowledge through literature, it was 
possible to develop research questions and an interview guide that was designed to fit the 
topic. Because the situation in oPt is ever-changing it was difficult for us to find reports, 
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statistics and data that would be relevant to the current economic situation. The quality and 
amount of statistics from PCBS has become better in later years, which helped on our 
research, together with recent reports (March 2012) from both the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund.    
 
Reports and studies done on the topic of international aid and business development were 
for the most part done for the West Bank as a whole. As there were few or none area 
specific reports, we needed to look at the area as a whole at first to get an indication of the 
situation. Depending on where you live in the West Bank, economic and social conditions 
differ. The only report we found on Nablus was one report from the GIZ (Hilal & Shalian, 
2001).  It was not exclusively restricted to the Nablus area, which makes the results we were 
left with subject to bias. There were, however, some statistics presented on Nablus from the 
(PCBS, 2011b) which we found useful in the place of more elaborated reports. 
 
4.3.3 Interview  
Conducting individual interviews is one of the most common methods for gathering 
qualitative data (Yin, 2009). The qualitative interview can be classified according to its 
degree of formality, the two main types of interview in quality research are the unstructured 
and semi-structured (Bryman, 2012). In this research we have conducted semi-structured 
interviews, based on an interview guide with key elements for the research. Strengths with 
the interview are that it’s targeted, and focuses directly on the focus of our topic.  It’s 
insightful and “provides perceived casual inferences and explanations” (Yin, p.102). 
Weaknesses are biases due to poorly articulated questions along with response bias, 
inaccuracies due to poor recall, and reflexivity; the interviewee says what the interviewer 
wants to hear (Yin, 2009). In our opinion there were little difficulties with the language 
barrier as all of our informants spoke English and an Arabic translator was not necessary. We 
do see the potential biases regarding the possibility that there could have been 
misunderstandings or confusions regarding questions because of language issues. 
 
Interviews were a great supplementary source of information. We could ask questions of 
how things were done and what was really happening on the ground, but also in bigger 
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organizations. We would not have been able to gather the same data, and achieve the same 
understanding of the situation had we not conducted these interviews.   
 
Informants 
We had early decided that we would seek information from different organizations and 
people. We wanted to get the view from major donors, the government, PNGOs, INGOs and 
local business owners, and chose informants based on this criterion. Most of these were 
chosen randomly in Palestine mainly because of convenience and access. Some 
organizations that we believed to have a busy schedule were contacted prior to our arrival in 
Palestine. With the thought of selection bias in mind we were mindful of whether or not our 
sampling group was representative or not. With a peak of large amounts of data quite early 
we reached a point of information saturation. We felt that the information we got was no 
longer new to us and did not feel the need to expand our group of informants.    
 
4.3.4 Observation 
Gold (1958) identifies four different roles in field observations; The complete participant - 
takes an insider role, is fully part of the setting and often observes covertly. The participant 
as observer - the researcher gains access to a setting by virtue of having a natural and non-
research reason for being part of the setting.  As observers, we are part of the group being 
studied. The observer as participant - In this role, the researcher or observer has only 
minimal involvement in the social setting being studied.  There is some connection to the 
setting but the observer is not naturally and normally part of the social setting. The complete 
observer - the researcher does not take part in the social setting at all.   
 
As it is hard to contain a certain role through the entire study period, when it is conducted 
over time, it is not unlikely that an observer can take on different roles throughout the 
period. We believe we have inhabited both the role as the participant as observer, and 
observer as participant during our fieldwork. Different roles were exhibited when we were in 
the interview setting as opposed to the “daily life” setting. Common to both roles were that 
our agenda was known. 
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4.3.5 Questionnaire  
For getting more information on how small business owners felt about international aid we 
developed a small questionnaire with 16 questions. The first ten questions were created to 
get information about the business, and whether they had received aid. The last six 
questions were regarding their thoughts on specific issues related to the way aid is given, on 
a scale from one to ten.  
 
The questionnaire was translated from English to Arabic by a Palestinian English student. It 
was also reviewed by three other Palestinians, independent from each other to strengthen 
the validity of the questionnaire. The questionnaire was then given to 19 random shops in 
the local market in Nablus. The number of shops chosen was due to the time aspect, and we 
questioned as many as we could with the time available to us. We also tried to target 
different types of small businesses, that being food, clothing, restaurants, pharmacy and so 
on. To make sure the people answering the questionnaire understood the meaning of the 
questions in the right way, we had a Palestinian translator with us to help with the language 
barrier. We had prepared the translator with our questions, and explained what we meant 
by each of them, in order to get clarity. 
 
4.4 Validity and Reliability 
4.4.1. Validity 
Results are valid “if the explanations are really true or accurate and correctly capture what is 
actually happening” (Gibbs, p.91). To find the validity of our research design we looked at 
these aspects presented by Yin, 2009, p.40: 
- Construct validity: identifying correct operational measures for the concept being 
studied.  
- Internal validity: seeking to establish a causal relationship, whereby certain 
conditions are believed to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious 
relationships 
- External validity: defining the domain to which a study’s findings can be generalized 
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Construct validity 
In order to get construct validity we used multiple sources of evidence, literature, interviews 
and observation, which could also be described as method triangulation. “By getting more 
than one different view on a subject, an accurate (or more accurate) view of the subject 
matter can be obtained” (Gibbs, p.94). We have not, however, had key informants review 
drafts or case study reports, which limits the validity. We have had other independent 
volunteers review our report though, which would clarify if some aspects were unclear or 
not understandable. 
Internal validity  
In our research we have looked at different aspects of aid distribution and how it affects the 
private sector business development, in addition to how the aid given to the government as 
budget support also has an effect on the economy. The concern regarding internal validity 
was to follow logic models and do explanation building. To follow a logical summary to reach 
conclusions while at the same time keep our minds open to opposing explanations. Because 
of the highly political climate in this area we tried our best not to get politically involved and 
because of that biased. We also tried not to make assumptions and conclusions because of 
preconceptions of ideas we thought to exist. We believe we have managed this to a certain 
degree, but it’s hard not to be political at all when researching an area like Palestine, 
because of the pressing political aspects presented at all times.  
External validity 
To see whether or not “the study’s findings are generalizable beyond the immediate case 
study” (Yin, p.43), shows us the degree of external validity. The selection of our informants is 
not necessarily representative for the whole population, and the opinions of our chosen 
organizations are not necessarily the opinions of all organizations in Palestine. There is, 
however still a potential for transferability, as the same mechanisms, structures and 
guidelines apply in other aid situations. The theoretical approaches we have used are also 
used for other cases, strengthening the external validity.   
4.4.2. Reliability 
The objective of reliability is to make sure that if a later researcher were to follow our 
procedure and conduct the same case study as us, they would come to the same findings; 
“The goal of reliability is to minimize the errors and biases in a study” (Yin, p 45). Whether or 
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not we can rely on the data we have collected is connected to the procedures implemented 
in order to gather the data. Due to changing conditions in both the human nature and also 
the area of the case study, it would be difficult to repeat or reconstruct the study precisely. 
Our choice of informants was based on random selection, which could mean that if other 
random subjects were chosen the answers could have been different. It also means that if a 
different research were to be conducted, the selection of informants could have an 
implication on the results.   
4.4.3. Transferability 
It’s been debated whether generalization is possible in qualitative studies, “the idea of 
replicating previous studies, a goal of much experimental and survey research, is usually 
regarded as being inappropriate in qualitative research” (Blaikie, p. 217). Blaikie goes on to 
illuminate the fact that it is not necessarily a wish to have the same qualitative study 
repeated, and that it is hard to have the exact conditions present; That being the researcher 
and his/her interpretations, the research object, and time - as the time of research will never 
be the same either, as the human behavior is dynamic.  These are all conditions that are 
subject to change, and may cause the results to differ.  Danemark et. al. (1997) claims all 
science should have generalizable aspects. Further they say generalizing could mean 
different things, all depending on the conclusion, and what methods are used to retrieve the 
info. Results are “generalizable if they are true for a wide (but specific) range of 
circumstances beyond those studied in the particular research” (Gibbs, p.91). 
As for our research, we are aware of the fact that the situation in the West Bank differs in 
various locations. Because of that, a study of Nablus as a city will not automatically be 
transferrable to other cities. However, the system of aid, and how it’s distributed, conditions 
laid upon recipients, and so on, are issues that in our opinion are generalizable. For Nablus 
city, we believe, that were someone to come and conduct the same study again, they would 
find the same results.   
 
4.5 Strengths and weaknesses 
Being two students writing this thesis together was a big advantage and a positive 
experience, not only during our fieldwork, but also throughout the entire research process. 
44 
 
When we were out of ideas, we could bounce new ideas of each other and engage in 
discussion about our thesis. This would not have been possible to do in the same way with a 
fellow student writing a different thesis. The insight we both have gained on this topic is 
exceptional, and because of that it has been good to have a companion to share reflections 
on observations and experiences with. 
 
To conduct fieldwork has been a strengthening of the reliability, because we received our 
information from different sources in organizations and sectors, which was consistent and 
similar at the different levels represented. The knowledge of the situation we were studying 
would not have been possible through reading reports and other literature. The weaknesses 
with our fieldwork was that it was conducted in a limited area, and it was difficult to cover all 
aspects related the subject in an equally thorough matter. Because of time limitations, we 
had to narrow down our thesis to cover certain chosen topics. In addition there could be a 
weakness regarding the use of a translator when conducting our questionnaire research, as 
we could not know what exactly was said between the two parts.   
 
With our chosen methods we could analyze the interviews we had conducted, the results 
from the questionnaire and also our observations during the fieldwork. We could also 
analyze written material from recent reports up against our own findings. Analyzing old 
reports, from the end of the second intifada (2007) and earlier, was of little or no use, as the 
situation has changed so much since then. Because of the relevance to our study this was 
not done.   
 
The shortcoming to a stay of five weeks is the fact that this conflict has been going on for 
over 60 years. Although we feel we have gained large amounts of information, it is still not 
enough for us to understand the contexts and situation 100%.  The highly complex situation 
takes time to comprehend, and even though we were conducting fieldwork, we were still 
“guests” to the country. We cannot fully comprehend the life of Palestinians or how the aid 
system works. We can, however, use the knowledge we now possess and to analyze the 
findings.  
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5.0 Findings 
5.1 Occupations effect on the economy 
Restrictions  
The Ad Hoc Liaison Committee report from March 2012 states that “Israeli restrictions 
represent the biggest constraint facing Palestinian private sectors growth”.  Movement and 
access within the oPt is restricted by a combination of physical obstacles – most notably the 
Barrier, separation wall, checkpoints – and by bureaucratic constraints, such as permits and 
access restricted areas. The World Banks report from 2006 states: “The closed regime – i.e. 
the system of restrictions on the movement of goods and people both within the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip and through Israel to the rest of the world, have fragmented the Palestinian 
economy and reduced its potential”.  
 
Israeli restrictions prevent Palestinians from accessing much of their land and from 
exploiting their natural resources; they isolate the Palestinians from global markets, and 
fragment their territory into small, “cantons” (PMNE & ARIJ, 2011). In the West Bank, the 
application of movement and access restrictions is discriminatory, targeting mostly 
Palestinian residents, for the benefit of the Israeli settler population (OCHA, 2011).  
 
Previous to the year 2000, and the 1st intifada, Nablus was the industrial city, a city of 
economic growth. Many workshops and factories in the West Bank were located in Nablus, 
but after the 2nd intifada there was a curfew and closure imposed on the city, and the 
situation changed.  
 An informant from the government explained that until 2007, Nablus was moving towards 
poverty. From 2000 to 2006, Nablus suffered from businesses escaping the city; people 
transferred it elsewhere. Cities like Hebron and Ramallah took advantage of the situation 
(the economy and industry) and most of the big investors went to Ramallah, she told us. 
Investors were hesitant to start up in Nablus.  
Informants from small and medium sized businesses also agreed to the fact that there is a 
certain amount of reluctance to establish new businesses in the city; they don’t feel it’s safe 
to establish their business in Nablus. From 2007, there has been a gradual lift of the barriers 
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around the city, but the economic situation has still not changed at the same rate; “most of 
the money that was in Nablus escaped, and hasn’t come back.” 
5.1.2 Constraints caused by the occupation 
Nablus district  has 6 checkpoints, three partial checkpoints, 33 earth mounds blocking exit 
roads from major thoroughfares, eight roadblocks 5,400 meters of trenches and 3,363 
meters of earth walls preventing free movement (Ma’an, 2012). 
Permits 
Palestinians need to apply for permits from Israel, for different activities. All from building 
houses, entering Jerusalem and Israel, importing and exporting goods, traveling ect. The 
NGOs and business owners meant that the biggest problem with permits was that its take a 
long time to get them. Sometimes it can even take years to get a permit to build a house, if 
it’s not denied altogether. One informant from a medium size business said they could be 
interested in a project, but by the time the permit is clear, the project is no longer attractive 
to the investor. It’s too time-consuming, and many opportunities are wasted because of the 
issue with permits.    
Freedom of movement 
The occupation causes a number of difficulties for the Palestinian society. All of our 
informants from the different sector: academia, NGOs, business owners, government; they 
all saw the occupation as the main problem for business development, especially, the lack of 
freedom of movement. 
People cannot go where they want, or in worst case even talk to each other. Checkpoints 
leave constraints on the mobility, with both being time consuming and with them sometimes 
being closed entirely. An informant gave us an example; they had a meeting with partner 
organizations in Gaza but since he cannot enter Gaza they had to meet in Cairo. A couple of 
hours with a car became 2 days of traveling. The problem with checkpoints also results in 
people giving up altogether, as one medium size business owner said; “Now most of the 
people who has capital in Nablus, are working outside, Ramallah for instance.”  
In 2002 Israel began building the “separation wall”. According to UNSCO, by 2011, 440 km 
(62 percent) of the planned 709-kilometre-long barrier was completed (UNCTAD, 2011).  
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About 85 per cent of the barrier is built inside Palestinian land (OCHA, 2009). In the West 
Bank alone, there are fixed 500 obstacles to the movement of Palestinian people and goods 
(Ibid). 
 
Many Palestinians used to work inside Israel. They are no longer allowed to work there 
which in addition to creating more jobless people it also puts an end to a great deal of 
income to the Palestinian society.  
 
5.10.3 Import/export  
Israel imposes different restrictions on trade, especially on import and export. 
These restrictions lead to different types of costs for the business environment, which can 
be divided into two categories (PMNE, ARIJ, 2011): 
 
1.  Lack of availability and higher costs of inputs to production due to the ‘dual use’ item 
list. 
2.  Costs of the restrictions in handling, processing and transporting imports and 
exports. 
Import 
Dual-use items are goods, raw materials and equipments and spare parts that have both 
civilian use as well as potentially other use that Gol views as a security threat.  Since 2002, 
the Government of Israel (GoI) has progressively added materials, machinery, and 
equipment (including telecommunications equipment) to the list of items considered “dual-
use” (PMNE & ARIJ, 2011; World Bank, 2012). In 2008, as part of the new Defence Export 
Control Law, a new list was approved by MoD that includes 56 items. The latter includes; 
fertilizers, chemicals and raw materials for industry, steel pipes, lathe and milling machines, 
optical equipment, and navigation aids, amongst others (PMNE & ARIJ, p.5). 
 
The GoI has a system of bureaucratic controls that require the GoI to approve their transfer 
to the West Bank. Importers must obtain a license in order to import the dual use items; 
however, most companies fail to get the license. The authorization is gained through an 
application process for permits and licenses, but the permission for many goods is so rarely 
48 
 
obtained, so as a result, the goods are banned. The process of handing out permissions must 
be repeated for every truckload of dual-use item, even for the same type of goods (PMNE & 
ARIJ, 2011). 
 
Box 1 illustrates some examples of how these restrictions affect specific companies. 
Box 1: Firm-level experience of the costs from dual use restrictions 
The National Aluminum and Profile Company “NAPCO”, located in Nablus, is a leading industrial 
aluminum profile. The company exports an estimated 10 truckloads of aluminum to Israel on a 
monthly basis. Due to the restrictions imposed on the entry of industrial inputs essential for 
aluminum anodizing (oxidizations) and nitration, the company is forced to make the needed 
processing steps in Israel. As a result, NAPCO’s extra costs per shipment of 400 kg are estimated 
at NIS 25,800, for aluminum anodizing, and NIS 6,464 for nitration.. These extra costs represent 
transportation and processing costs in Israel. 
 
Pal Karm Company for Cosmetics, located in Nablus, is a leading industrial cosmetics company. 
The company sells products in the local market and also exports to Israel. Around 50% - 60% of 
the company's sales are going to the Israeli market. The company has a wide experience in 
manufacturing cosmetics and skincare products: i.e. moisturizer and lipstick. Glycerin is an 
essential raw material for the company which is used in cosmetics to hold moisture against the 
skin and prevent dryness. Israel banned the entry of Glycerin into the Palestinian Territory since 
mid 2007. Ever since, the company has not able to sell skincare products in the Israeli market 
because the Israeli Health Authorities require Glycerin to be part of such products. The company 
estimates their losses at 30% of their sales in the Israeli market for this specific product. 
 
Al-Juneidi Dairy and Food Stuff Company was founded in 1982 in Hebron. Al-Juneidi is a leading 
industrial producer of dairy products and food stuff, which contains numerous products of food, 
dairy, salads, and snacks. Al-Juneidi uses packing material known as (Tetra-Pack) for packing 
their products. Further, it is internationally recommended to use hydrogen peroxide– H 2O2 
with a concentration of 35%. Since 2007, Israel only allows the entry of hydrogen peroxide of H 2 
O 2 with 17% concentration into the Palestinian Territory. This limitation severely impacts the 
productivity of the factory because the packing machine automatically stops when the sterilizing 
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materials concentration reaches low levels (12%). Therefore, the company has to install more 
sterilizing materials in order to resume production. Further, it is necessary to resterilize the 
whole production line again. Consequently, this process requires several hours, causing 
disruption in production. The estimated time for re-sterilizing and re-operation is 4 days per 
month, where the operating cost per day is estimated at NIS 5,000, which is around NIS 20,000 
per month. 
PalTrade, 2010 from (PMNE & ARIJ, 2011). 
 
 
Export 
Separation barrier isolates trade between oPt and global markets 
Due to the construction of the separation wall and restrictions like checkpoints and 
roadblocks, export to Israel, which accounts for 90% of all export, fell by 3o% during 2008 – 
2009 (UNCTAD, 2011). Restrictions on Palestinian export and import tightened even more 
during 2010 (IMF, 2011).  Repeated and lengthy Israeli security checks force Palestinian 
traders into long queues at the crossing points, which have inadequate facilities and limited 
working hours. Many businesses lose income because of goods being damaged by long 
waiting times at checkpoint. Especially fresh produce (UNCTAD, 2011). 
 
 All cargo must also use a back-to-back loading system, where shipments are downloaded 
from Palestinian to Israel trucks or vice versa: a procedure that adds significant cost and 
delays to the shipping process (World Bank, 2012).  The PA deputy economic minister Abdel 
Hafiz Nofal says that the back-to-back system, internal West Bank checkpoints, and the 
clearance process at Israeli ports that require Palestinian goods to be searched several times 
and often held in warehouses for long periods, delay trade,” . 
(http://electronicintifada.net/content/israel-chokes-palestinian-trade-says-un-study/10352). 
 
Withholding PA customs clearance revenue aggravates fiscal instability 
A major source of fiscal instability is in Israeli control over the tax and customs clearance 
revenue that it collects on behalf of the PA. Israel has resorted to withholding tax and 
customs clearance revenue. This happened in 2002 and 2006 (UNCTAD, 2008). Revenue 
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from customs clearance represents 60–70 per cent of total PA revenue. In May 2011, Israel 
considered withholding some $100 million of customs clearance revenues owed to the PA 
following Palestinian national reconciliation efforts (UN, 2012). Israel eventually released the 
delayed revenue (UNCTAD, 2008).  
 
5.2 The Cost of Occupation 
The Palestinian Ministry of National Economy in cooperation with the Applied Research 
Institute- Jerusalem released a report on the costs of the occupation. The total result is 
represented in the table in appendix 3. 
 
The report estimates that the total measurable cost of the Israeli occupation on the 
Palestinian economy in 2010 was USD 6.897 billion; 84.9% of the total Palestinian GDP in 
2010. As the costs are measured in current prices, the report used GDP in 2010 measured in 
current prices. For that it uses the estimate of USD 8.124 billion provided by the IMF and the 
Palestinian Ministry of Finance (PMNE & ARIJ, 2011).  
 
The costs are split into direct and indirect costs. The former are extra costs, which are 
directly borne by the Palestinian economy due to Israeli restrictions; these include higher 
costs of electricity, water, and the movements of goods and people. The latter form the 
major part of the costs of the Israeli occupation and concern the foregone revenues from 
production that have yet to be realized, due to the restrictions imposed by the occupation. 
Examples of these indirect costs include the value added from the extraction of minerals and 
salts in the Dead Sea, and the royalties from the development of the offshore marine gas 
field of Gaza. It limits the estimation of indirect costs to sectors such as natural resource 
exploitation, so that it can confidently quantify the opportunity cost of not developing any 
economic activities. As such, it does not include the probable missed revenues from not 
developing certain industries due to the import restrictions imposed by Israel in the 
estimation (PMNE & ARIJ, 2011). 
5.1.1 Budget support 
Aid from international donors to the oPt “increased by 500% in the last decade, exceeding 
$3bn in 2009. This meant that on a per capita basis the Palestinian population received one 
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of the highest levels of aid in the World. Aid is also significant compared to the size of the 
Palestinian economy. With a GDP of only $6.2bn in 2009, aid effectively represented just less 
than half the economy. In addition, it is a dominant source of finance for the PA budget, with 
budget support covering 42% of recurrent government spending in 2009, and 38% in 2010” 
(MAS, 2011, p.1). 
A study on aid by the Palestine Economic Policy and Research Institute (MAS) (DeVoir & 
Tartir, 2009) identifies a shift in type and sources of aid in different political situations. As we 
see in the following figure, aid provided as budget support has increased significantly in 
recent years. In 2008, however there is a change again towards development assistance.  
“Support to development assistance is projected to reach $1.09bn in 2013, or 68% of total 
aid, which will hopefully generate more productive, long term and sustainable growth” 
(MAS, 2011, p.4).  
Figure 3: Type of aid disbursed to the West bank and Gaza 2002-2008 
 
Source: Palestinian MoP PAMS database (DeVoir & Tartir, 2009) 
We also see the exceeding focus on development in the following table, on projected 
expenditures for development from the National Development Plan (NDP) 2011-2013. The 
NDP forms the basis of requests for $6.8bn of external finance from donors over three years 
(Palestinian Authority (PA), 2011). It includes $1.5bn for Gaza reconstruction and $0.5bn for 
East Jerusalem, with the remaining $4.8bn divided equally between budget support for 
recurrent spending and development assistance. As we see in table 4, the amount provided 
for budget support is declining, as the budget for development assistance is increasing. 
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Table 4: Planned national expenditure 
In $m Budget 
Support 
Development Assistance 
Year Governance Social Economy  Infrastructure Total 
2011 967 142 142 74 142 500 
2012 881 207 283 135 248 873 
2013 501 207 385 192 311 1,095 
Total 
Expenditure 
2,349 556 810 401 701 2,468 
Source: PA, 2011 
The planned national development expenditure is distributed among four different focus 
areas; Governance, Social, Economy and Infrastructure. As part of the economy main 
emphasis we find the private sector development, and “will lead the drive to build an open 
and vibrant economy” (PA, p.77). The expenditures projected to be distributed in the 
Economy area are presented according to the following table, where the total amount sums 
up to 28%, 32% and 35% of total development expenditure for the years 2011-2013 
respectively; 
Table 5: Planned expenditure by category 
 
Category 
Planned 
Expenditure 
2011-2013 
In US$ m 
% of 
planned 
expenditure  
%  of total 
planned 
development 
assistance 
Industrial modernisation 
& business promotion 
116.8 29 % 4,7 % 
Foreign trade & investment 8.7 2 % 0,4 % 
Consumer protection 1.7 1 % 0,07 % 
Employment & worker protection 31 8 % 1,3 % 
Agricultural & rural development 177.9 44 % 7,2 % 
Telecommunications & IT 15.9 4 % 0,6 % 
Tourism & antiques 49.1 12 % 2 % 
Total 401,1 100 % 16 % 
Source: PA, 2011 
5.1.2 Economic situation 
Donor aid to support the 2011 recurrent budget was considerably lower than predicted in 
the 2011 budget. The PA’s wage bill continued to grow in 2011, and ended the year 1 
percent over budget, and 6 percent higher than 2010.  
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Table 6: 2011 expenditures of the Palestinian Authority by category  
Expenditure Item Amount (NIS million) Percent of total 
expenditure 
Wage expenditure 
Nonwage expenditure 
- Operational expenditure 
- Transfers 
- Minor capital 
expenditure 
Net lending 
6,381 
5,015 
1,792 
3,165 
58 
501 
53.6 
42.2 
15.1 
26.6 
0.5 
4.2 
Total 11,897 100 
Source: World Bank, 2012 
Based on the average exchange rate in 2011(see ad hoc p.6 footnote), the total spending 
results were $3.3bn dollars, where half of this were wage expenditures. As we see of the 
table following, the number of Palestinian Authority employees has steadily increased and 
represents just less of 90 000 employees in 2011. The PA has however decreased 
unnecessary spending, such as cars for employees and reduced the amount of new people 
that are employed (ad hoc).  
Figure 4: Number of Palestinian Authority employees, 2008-20119 
In 2011, the PA required 
US$1.5 billion dollars in 
budget support, of which 
US$200 million were to 
cover development 
expenses not funded by 
donors. The PA only 
received about US$814 
million in budget 
support, as opposed to 
the US$1.0 bn that was anticipated. They received US$169 million in development financing 
compared to $370 million committed for development projects and the $500 million that 
was projected in the 2011 budget, adding up to a total of US$983 million. The remaining 
                                                          
9 Source: World Bank, 2012 
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deficit was financed by borrowing from the local banking sector, and accumulating around 
$260 million in arrears to the private sector. The gap was filled, but it’s unlikely that the 
banks and the private sector will allow or even has the capacity to let the PA to continue to 
borrow this amount again (World Bank, 2012; IMF, 2012). 
The PA’s fiscal situation is likely to worsen in 2012. The projected recurrent deficit is 
expected to be about US$1.1 bn. This represents a nearly 14 percent decline from the 2011 
budget. It reflects the PA’s determination to control spending and increase revenues (World 
Bank, 2012). Following is the 2012 budget, presented by the Palestinian Authority  
Table 7: Palestinian Authority budget for fiscal year 2012 (in million $)  
Item Amount 
Total Revenues 2,354 
Public Revenues 2,235 
Domestic Revenues 812 
Clearance with Israel 1,542 
Tax Refunds -119 
Total Expenditure 3,538 
Recurrent Expenditure 3,188 
Wages 1,793 
Non-Wages 1,290 
Net Lending 105 
Development Expenditure 350 
Total Deficit 1,303 
Recurrent Deficit 953 
Development Expenditure 350 
Total External Financing 1,303 
Budget Support 1003 
Development Financing 300 
Financing Gap 0 
Source: Portland trust, 2012a 
Based on this there is no financial gap, the PA is, however, only able to identify about 
US$610 in external support, leaving a gap of some US$540 million according to the projected 
external financing (World Bank, 2012). The PA is making a concrete effort to find additional 
savings and reduce the deficit to a more manageable size. (World Bank, 2012; IMF, 2012). 
This graph shows how the deficit has developed in the recent years; 
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Figure 5: Deficit in general budget in the Palestinian Territory, (2004-2011) (Value in USD 
Million)
Source: PCBS, 2012 
An IMF report from March 2012 says; “It will be very difficult for the PA to cover the 2012 
financing gap through austerity alone, without the prompt pledging and disbursement of 
additional aid. There is also a need for an enhanced donor coordination framework to 
enhance the predictability of aid, which has varied widely by donor in recent years. For 
example, while the EU countries’ disbursements have generally been predictable, in line with 
yearly plans, many of the regional donors‘ disbursements have been made on an ad hoc 
basis with little advance planning” (World Bank, p.23) On this matter the EU, the Swiss 
confederation and Austria made a contribution of € 10m, in April 2012, to this year’s first 
payment of social allowances to poor and vulnerable families.(MAS, 2012a). On the 9th of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 1: Mahmoud Jbbarin’s Vegetable shop 
Jbbarin opened his vegetable shop in Ramallah at the begging of April 2012. The PAs 
salaries were delayed in April with the EU having to give extra assistance in budget 
support for the PA to be able to pay its employees. Jbbarin told us that this had a 
dramatic effect on his business and that he was worried he would have to close his 
business because of this. He also told us that it was hard to run a business under the 
circumstances of never knowing if the PA were going to be able to pay its salaries.  In 
June 2012, the shop was closed, because he never recovered from the negative 
impact that came with the delayed salaries. 
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May, The European Union contributed an additional € 22.5 million to help the PA pay for the 
April 2012 salaries and pensions for around 84, 500 Palestinian public service providers and 
pensioners (EU, 2012a). John Gatt-Rutter is quoted with this in a press release from the EU in 
May 2012:  
 
“In these very challenging times for the Palestinian Authority, this new contribution shows 
again the EU’s continuing financial support to its institutions and their ability to provide 
essential public services to the Palestinian people…The EU calls on all parties concerned to 
fulfill their obligations with regards to the PA in a timely and reliable manner” (EU, 2012a). 
 
The PA is determent to reduce the external aid, and stick to the 2011-2013 national 
development plan. Based on this, external support for recurrent and capital expenditure will 
decline gradually. In 2008 the external support amounted to 32% of GDP, in 2010 it was 17%, 
and by 2013 it should reach 15% if the plan is followed.      
Table 8: External financing 2006 – 2010  
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
% of GDP Act. Act. Act. Act. Act. 
Financing for recurrent expenditure 16,3 19,4 28,9 22,0 15,5 
Financing for development expenditure 6,2 2,5 3,5 6,5 1,8 
Total 22,5 21,9 32,4 28,5 17,3 
Source: World Bank, 2012 
5.2 PA strategy 
Economic growth in 2008–10 was supported by a combination of steady reforms, donor aid, 
and easing of restrictions. Aid was essential in supporting the PA‘s institution-building and 
development efforts, and the reestablishment of law and order in the West Bank, all of 
which were crucial for bolstering private sector confidence and expansion. (IMF, 2012) 
Economic growth in 2010 was not a sign of sustainable recovery, but rather a sign of an 
economy operating from a low base (UNCTAD, 2011). 
“The GDP growth in 2010 was to a large extent “jobless” because it failed to make a dent in 
the high unemployment rate that has persisted for a decade. The growth was achieved 
largely by better utilization of existing resources but does not reflect an increase in 
investment. Weakness of the private sector and the high risk it faces, combined with the PA 
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fiscal austerity which features – inter alia – containment of public employment and salaries, 
explain the lack of progress on job creation” (UNCTAD, p.5). 
In addition, donor aid has been reduced significantly since early 2011, it declined to levels 
lower than the levels needed to finance the already tight budget; there has also been an 
absence of relaxation on movement and access restrictions which have been growing since 
2009, the stagnation of relaxation has also affected the contribution of donor aid. Both of 
these aspects are posing risks to the Palestinian economy’s outlook (IMF, 2012). The easing 
of controls on trade and other activities are important to make sure that the growth is 
continued, “at least to offset the impact of the PA‘s fiscal retrenchment and declining aid on 
private sector activity and investment” (IMF, p.22). Previously there has been a steady 
progress regarding the legal and regulatory reforms, they have slowed down, causing worry 
and skepticism from investors (World Bank, 2012).  
One of PA’s strategies for reducing aid dependency is to increase tax revenues; “…the 
strategy for increasing domestic tax revenues is to improve and expand the mechanisms for 
collecting tax, reduce tax evasion and implement an austerity policy especially in the 
automotive and fuel sectors” (MAS, 2011, p.3).  
The other part of the PA’s strategy is to encourage private sector development, in order to 
succeed in generating a more sustainable growth and lift the revenue situation and job 
creation. “Since 2007 the PA has taken serious measures and steps towards encouraging 
investment, reforming the legal and regulatory framework and fostering public-private 
partnerships” (MAS, 2011, p.4). Donors too are moving to focus more on private sector 
development; “…the EU has been putting its focus on the development of the private – 
sector, through a comprehensive approach via numbers of different projects” (Ibid) 
The AHLC claims it is necessary to have a strong private sector growth to generate revenues 
to sustain service delivery. Still, the private sector is held back by the restrictions on access 
to natural resources and markets by the Israeli restrictions. The restrictions “which are the 
biggest constraint on the growth of the Palestinian private sector” (World Bank, 2012, p.21). 
The PA has much work to do in creating an encouraging business environment, and the ad 
hoc liaison committee presses that “the PA should strive to create a business environment 
that is among the best in the world and not merely on a par with its neighbors” (Ibid). The 
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PA has, however, not been able to accomplish this, and there has been little recent 
improvement in the business environment, even though fiscal sustainability can only come 
through sustained and rapid private sector growth (World Bank, 2012). 
  
5.3 Focus on private sector 
The National Development Plan 2011-2013 states that “The government is committed to 
building a free and competitive economy through close cooperation between a competent 
and visionary public sector and a pioneering private sector. Our economic policy agenda 
focuses on developing domestic capacities and resources, creating an environment that 
attracts investment, and laying the foundations of sustainable growth and development 
which will ultimately eliminate dependency on external aid” (PA, p.43). 
One informant from the government says the aid situation in Nablus is haphazard, and not 
related to the national plans. This informant said it feels a little bit like the PA has forgotten 
about Nablus, and that not much has been done for the development in the city the last ten 
years.  
“The development of our private sector has been stunted by the denial of freedom to 
engage in the open exchange of ideas, technologies and trade with the outside world. Free 
of the constraints imposed by the occupation. Colonization and exploitation of our land and 
natural resources, Palestine will have enormous potential for private-sector led growth. Such 
growth is critical to our plans to eradicate poverty, tackle unemployment and propel 
Palestine and its citizens rapidly forward from a state of aid dependency towards self-
sufficiency” (PA, p.43). The participation rate of labor force (aged 15 years and above) in 
2010 in Nablus Governorate was 43% from total of human power. Unemployed persons 
constitute about 13.7% of those participating in labor force (PCBS, 2011b). 
The prospects from the National Development Plan states that: “Over the coming three 
years we will consolidate our efforts to work in partnership with the private sector” (PA, 
p.45). The main challenge to be addressed will be the need for reform of the legal and 
regulatory framework in order to reduce bureaucratic ‘red tape’ and provide investors and 
companies with the confidence and certainty needed to do business in Palestine. In Nablus 
an informant from the government says they encourage the private sector to invest and 
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establish businesses, and try to consolidate the relationship between the public and the 
private sector, to have good partnerships. Industrially the situation is improving, but it is not 
as it used to be, and work still needs to be done here.  
5.4 Aid and politics 
This sub-chapter will show how donors use politics in their funding choices.  
According to a report from Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (2009), the amount 
and type of external aid entering the West Bank and Gaza varied according to political 
conditions. In times of political struggle external aid moved away from development and the 
PA to emergency relief programs.  The report (DeVoir & Tartir, 2009) also stated that 
amongst donors, Europe is by far the largest donor to both the Palestinian Authority and the 
PNGO sector, providing nearly 70% of the total funding to the latter. Aid from the Arab 
countries to Palestine had decreased in comparison to Western donors and primarily 
contributed to the Palestinian Authority’s budget. In times of political crises the amount of 
aid from Arab countries increased while aid from Europe and USA decreased.  
 
 As might be expected, at times of political instability, humanitarian aid increased. The 
relative volumes of the other two main types of aid – budget support and development 
assistance – are also shown to have changed over time (MAS, 2011).  
Figure 6: External Assistance to the Palestinian Authority 
 
Source: MAS, 2011. 
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5.4.1 Examples of how aid follows politics  
 
2006 Elections 
The Hamas party won the Palestinian Legislative Elections in January 2006. This resulted in 
financial sanctions against the PA. In addition to funding “drying up”, it also meant a loss of 
VAT and trade clearance revenue transfers from Israel and decreased loan availability to the 
PA (Devoir & Tartin 2009; Ibrahim, 2011). The results of our questionnaire shows that 17 of 
the 19 asked small business owners felt the effect of the sanctions towards the PA in 2006.  
 
According to the Ministry of Planning; ‘in response to the yearlong fiscal crisis and the 
resulting inability of the government to provide essential services to its citizens, a National 
Unity Government was formed between February and March of 2007. However, many 
donors continued to bypass the PA’ (MoP, 2008, in DeVoir & Tartin 2009, p.9), meaning that 
public salaries continued to go unpaid and development projects ground to a halt (DeVoir & 
Tartin 2009). 
 
In June of 2007, fighting erupted between Fatah and Hamas in Gaza, resulting in the deaths 
of 118 Palestinians and Hamas control over the Gaza Strip. Following the Hamas takeover, 
humanitarian aid almost doubled, from $491 million in 2005 to $885 in 2008 (Portland Trust, 
2011). 
UN application for full membership 
In September 2011 President Mahmoud Abbas submitted an application for full UN 
membership. After this USAID put a hold on funding to the oPt several planned projects 
were put on hold and over 200 employers were laid off. The EU did not cut their funding and 
the Arab League appealed to its member States to bolster financial help to the Palestinians 
(Unipal, 2012). 
Palestine full membership in the UNESCO 
On October 31st, 2011, UNESCO admitted Palestine as a full member. The same day the 
spokesperson from the US state department announced that it would cut all founds to the 
agency.  “The United States also remains strongly committed to robust multilateral 
engagement across the UN system. However, Palestinian membership as a state in UNESCO 
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triggers longstanding legislative restrictions which will compel 
the United States to refrain from making contributions to 
UNESCO.”10 
 
A government informant told us that USAID had cut all funding 
for new projects. The projects that were already started would 
be finished. We tried getting an interview with representatives 
from USAID but they were not able to meet us.   
 
5.5 Local Structures/Dynamics 
5.5.1 NGOs effect on private sector 
In 2011, the number of employees in the Palestinian Territory 
reached 837 000 employees compared to 744 000 employees 
in 2010. As a result, the unemployment rate in the Palestinian 
Territory decreased to 21% in 2011. The percentage of the real 
daily wage went down by 3% compared with 2010, which 
demonstrated a low purchasing power of individuals in the 
Palestinian Territory, i.e. any increase in nominal pay of the 
laborer was less than the high level of prices in the Palestinian 
Territory (PCBS, 2011a). An informant from an INGO told us 
that the cost of living, especially in the big cities, is high 
compared to the salaries people get. She said that even with 
the salary you get from an INGO it’s hard to make the ends 
meet.  
Khaled Al Sabawi is the Founder and President of MENA 
Geothermal based in Ramallah, Palestine. In an article from 
May 2011 he states that the growing number of NGOs has made it exceptionally difficult for 
Palestinian businesses to find professional human capital in the West Bank. He says it’s a 
challenge to compete with the NGOs. Because of the amount of donor funds provided, many 
NGOs are able to offer salaries that are three or four times higher than what the local private 
                                                          
10
 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/10/176418.htm 
Case 2: The Stolen 
Money 
In our questionnaire we 
had one question 
regarding how the 
businesses felt about 
humanitarian aid given 
through cash for food 
and food distribution.  
“On a scale from 1-10, 
how positive is cash for 
work and food 
distribution aid, in your 
opinion? “ 
 Almost all our 
informants 
misunderstood this 
question and asked us if 
we were there to find the 
“stolen money”. After 
talking to them, they said 
that there were 
problems of corruption 
with the humanitarian 
food distribution. If you 
were affiliated with 
certain political parties or 
knew the right people, 
you could get this help 
without qualifying for it.  
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sector can afford. He says that this raises labor costs and directly undermines the local 
private sectors ability to recruit educated professionals and build an autonomous Palestinian 
economy11.  
One informant from an INGO told us that it’s normal for students graduate from University, 
and instead of going in to the private sector, they start working in a NGO. Informants from 
both PNGOs and INGOs told us that private sector can’t compete with the NGOs. “It’s not 
just the NGOs stealing people, the economy isn’t able to grow therefore the private sector 
isn’t able to grow and then the private sector cant punch back. But how do you go back to 
the start though?” Another informant from a PNGO told us there where created too many 
NGOs in a short period of time and the private sector is suffering from this. The private 
marked needs a marked to their products. “Why will someone buy something they can get 
for free?”  
Salaries 
One informant told us that salary policy in NGOs is a hard balance. Local aid workers often 
get less salary then the international workers. One aid worker from an INGO told us that 
international aid workers often have lives in their home countries and that the salaries they 
got were not much compared to those at home, however, “we are colleagues, why shouldn’t 
we get the same salary? But you risk destroying the local power balance.”  
An informant from an INGO told us that they exclusively hire locals on field level and that 
they would never be able to do as good job as they did; “They have the ground knowledge 
that we never could learn or understand”. He explained that oPt being the political minefield 
that it is, it was very important for them to have local knowledge in the organization.  
 
5.5.2 Highly-skilled Migration 
 
Academic achievement  
The ratio of individuals (15 years and more) who have completed undergraduate and 
graduate university education was 9% in 2008 and about 13% have not finished any 
educational stage. According to available data, there is clear distinction between males and 
                                                          
11 http://www.themarknews.com/articles/5301-the-palestinian-aid-trap 
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females in academic achievement. The ratio of males who have completed their 
undergraduate and graduate university education was 10%, but 7% for females. About 10% 
male and 15% female individuals have not completed any educational stage. Moreover, 
findings have shown that the ratio of illiteracy among individuals 15 years and more was 5%, 
2% males compared to 7% females. According to PCBS 2005 statistics, the ratio of individuals 
holding vocational qualification was 2.5%, 3.4% males and 1.6% females (Shalabi, 2010). 
 
In 2007, the Palestinian population was estimated at 10.4 million, more than half of whom 
lived outside historic Palestine (Ibid). It’s difficult to estimate the volume of migration for the 
Palestinian people because it’s the Israel Authority controls the crossing points, restriction 
on movement and that it’s the Israeli Authority that controls the population register (Ibid).  
 
According to estimates from previous studies and data released by the Palestinian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs for arrivals and departures through land crossings, including the Allenby (Al 
Karamah) Bridge between the West Bank and Jordan and the Rafah Crossing between the 
Gaza Strip and Egypt, 20,000-30,000 Palestinians migrate each year. Over 2002-2007, more 
than 20,000 Palestinians migrated from the West Bank per annum.  These numbers does 
take into account the Palestinians that has Jerusalem ID cards. They have access to Israeli 
airports and crossing points (Ibid).  
 
Shalabi (p. 110) sums up the reasons for leaving in two categories:  
 Difficult political conditions, the occupation as well as closure, siege, movement 
restrictions, etc. Factors include internal political crisis and fragmentation.  
  Socio-Political Perspectives Difficult socio-economic conditions including high 
unemployment and poverty, the economical situation, a weak labour market, and the 
search on for better living conditions 
(Al Maliki and Shalabi 2000, in Shalabi 2010). 
 
A survey on brain drain in Palestine (Shalabi, 2010) studied migrants from Palestinians who is 
living abroad on a permanent basis. According to the study, political-security, economic and 
social factors drove Palestinians to leave Palestine for other countries. These factors were: 
feelings of insecurity given the deteriorated security situation; difficult access to workplaces 
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in light of Israeli checkpoints, closure and curfews; harassment by the Israeli authorities; low 
salaries and the hope of getting a better income; dissatisfaction with one’s job; and the 
search for a better lifestyle. A number of people had also migrated to get a higher education. 
(Ibid). 
 
Who is leaving? 
According to a survey conducted in three Palestinian cities, five families that had 138 
migrant members were surveyed. Over 61% of these had departed from Palestinian territory 
following the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000. The survey showed that, 56% left the 
country after they obtained their high-school certificate, 14% had a BA degree. 27% decided 
to migrate before they completed their education. 4% of migrants held Ph.D. degrees, 9% 
MA degrees, and 27% BA degrees (Mattaria et. Al., 2008, in Shalabi, 2010).  
 
 
5.6 Coordination and communication in aid distribution 
5.6.1 Aid to Private Sector 
The tables below show the priorities of different donors to the oPt. The EU used 2 per cent 
of their aid in private sector development. USAID used 25 per cent.  
During the period 2007-2010, €1.57 billion was committed for the following priorities: 
Table 9: EU’s funding priorities 
Priority Realized Amount in € 
million 
Direct & Indirect Financial Support for PA 61.0% 96 
Institution-building 3.5% 6 
Infrastructure Development 4.5% 7 
Private Sector Development 2.0% 3 
Support to UNRWA  29.0% 45 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/statistical_annex_en.pdf 
In figure 7 we can see how USAID had planned their funding in 2010. From this, roughly 25% 
was planned to be spent on economic development. What went to the private sector 
specifically was not stated.  
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Figure 7: USAID funding priorities 
 
In the following figure we can see how the Norwegian bilateral aid was distributed in 2010, 
of US$110 million, US$55 million was given for economic development and trade. How much 
exactly went to private sector development is not stated, however.   
Table 10: Norwegian bilateral aid to the Palestinian territory 2010, US $110 
million 
Category % Amount in US$ million 
Economic development and trade 56 % 61.6 
Good governance 21 % 23.1 
Education 9 % 9.9 
Health and social 12 % 13.2 
Environment and energy 2 % 2.2 
Expenses in Norway + unspecified 0 % 0.2 
Source: Norad, 2011. 
 
What is the money spent on? 
There are differences in transparency regarding project funding in the private sector 
development. The only data we found that specific mentioned private sector was from the 
EU. They spent €22 million in 2009 on a program that was to support businesses that were 
destroyed or damaged during “Operation Cast Lead”. Funded items included machinery, 
office furniture and equipment, as well as building and business premise material (EU, 
2012b).  
The EU states in their own document that explains what their aid goes to: “The specific 
needs of the private sector in Gaza, which has been devastated by Operation Cast Lead and 
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the continuous Israeli siege, continue to be one of the priorities in the area private sector 
development”. The EU is also looking into and planning similar projects in area C in the West 
Bank, in the areas that is most affected by the occupation (Ibid).  
Another area that EU defines as private sector development is paying back loans for the PA 
to private banks. From table 9 we also see that 2% of their funding from 2007-2010 was 
directed towards the private sector. As of 31 January, 2012, over €27 million were paid to 
support the payment of arrears to the private sector labeled as private sector development 
(Ibid).  
5.6.1.2 NGO aid to private sector development 
There are several NGOs that work with private sector development. One PNGO explained in 
detail how they worked;  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 3: One stop shop  
In general the center focuses on the micro, small and medium enterprises. Through 
providing technical assistance, training, coaching, creating business plans, information, 
exhibition, and trying to link them with other local businesses providers.  Help the 
beneficiaries to make a business plan, marketing plan, production plan, management plan, 
and a financial plan. The average grant given to the families was $5000.  
The donors selected which families are to be helped and give the PNGO a list. The donors 
select the criteria’s for who is to receive this help; the target group was woman, elderly and 
handicapped. They had 600 beneficiaries, 200 female, 200 elderly and 200 disabled. The 
informant told us that it was not easy working with these groups. They are often not 
educated and most of the businesses that started up had to close within 6 months. The 
informant meant that one of the main reasons for the businesses closing was that they 
didn’t manage the finances. So they faced cash deficit and debt, and then they started to 
sell their equipment. Another problem was that it was hard to link businesses together 
were there are many in one area producing the same product. Family businesses s is a big 
part of the culture in oPt and the family name is often the name of the business. The 
informant told us that it was important to understand the family conflict dynamics.  
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5.6.2 Aid coordination 
The aid coordination structure in the oPt was set up as the meeting of the AHLC in December 
2005. The aim was to improve the effectiveness of aid coordination structure based on 
national priorities to the Palestinian people in line with the OECD-DAC Pairs Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness12.  
In the following we will present some of the main coordination mechanisms and then focus 
on the participation of the private sector in the local coordination mechanisms.   
Institutional mechanisms of coordination 
Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC): The Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) is a 15-member 
committee that serves as the principal policy-level coordination mechanism for development 
assistance to the Palestinian people. The AHLC is chaired by Norway and co-sponsored by 
the EU and US. In addition, the United Nations participates together with the World Bank 
(Secretariat) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The AHLC seeks to encourage 
dialogue between donors, the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Government of Israel (GoI). 
Local Development Forum (LDF): The LDF is open to Palestinian National Authority 
representatives and all donors, United Nations and aid agencies, as well as to the 
representative of the Association of International Development Agencies. The LDF is co-
chaired by the Minister of Planning and Administrative Development, together with Norway, 
the World Bank and UNSCO. 
Strategy Groups (SGs):  
There are four Strategy Groups (SGs); Governance SG, Economic SG, Social Development SG, 
Infrastructure SG. They focus on programmatic coordination, and a better design of donor 
projects.  
The SGs are supported by the work of thirteen main sub-groups and twelve Sector Working 
Groups (SWGs) and one working group - that report to the SGs. These groups are the main 
tools of coordination between the PA and the donor community at the technical level. The 
SWG that is relevant in this thesis is Private Sector Development and Trade.  
                                                          
12 http://www.lacs.ps/article.aspx?id=4 
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Joint Liaison Committee (JLC): JLC comprises the PNA, the Government of Israel, LDF Co-
Chairs and major donors with the aim of enhancing tripartite cooperation at the local level 
and securing effective progress on AHLC priorities and decisions. 
Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR): PECDAR is 
governmental body for project implementation. 
5.6.3 Private Sector involvement in local coordination 
The Economic Strategy Group has a Private Sector development and Trade working group. 
The members of the Economic Strategy groups come from PA institutions and donors. There 
are no representatives from the private sector in the strategy group. In the working group 
there are representatives from PA institutions, Donors and Private Sector Organizations. The 
organizations are: : Bankers' Association, Construction Union, Federation of Chambers of 
Commerce, Insurance Union, Federation of Industry, Palestinian Businessmen Association, 
PALTRADE, Palestinian IT Association, Portland Trust, Shippers' Council, Tourism Association. 
There are no representatives from business owners.  
As far as we can see this is the private sector development and trade work group the only 
coordination mechanism where the private sector is somehow involved.  
5.7 Bureaucracy in aid distribution processes 
5.7.1. Application process 
An informant from a PNGO compared the applying process for EU funding to writing a 
master thesis. He said that in the end, the funding you got was not worth the work. An 
informant from a large private company told us that they have become experts on applying 
for aid grants. They had an own department in their firm that applied for grants.  Another 
informant from a medium size business told us that he had received a grant but he really 
didn’t need it. The company he owned had the capital to expand without the aid. “It’s the 
smaller businesses who need this money, but I know how to get it”.  
Many of the application forms are in English and not Arabic, even though Arabic is a UN 
language. The application process is often online and they don’t have an alternative paper 
version it you don’t have internet access. An informants told us that the agencies don’t take 
into consideration that if you have a bad internet connection and it breaks, or if you’re a 
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slow typer, your page will time out and you have to start all over. They also seldom come 
with guide notes. So if you get one question wrong you risk waiting six months and then get 
the message that you didn’t fill in the form right. She told us that people for a long time have 
asked for a standardized reporting and applying systems.   
An informant from an INGO told us that there are not an element of learning in the process, 
or discussing the challenges and failures.  We asked an informant how you could change the 
system do make it more accessible for people, she said: “Almost nobody goes and ask the 
local people and local organization, how it can be changed. What is practical in their 
capacity, what would they like to see and be done.  They are the fractional voice in the 
whole discussion”.  
An informant from a PNGO told us that it was frustrating to work with donors, they had their 
proposals and they didn’t have any influence of making any changes. “The donors don’t 
know the details of what the community needs.  They are not taking the local context into 
consideration”. The use of local resources was a priority when establishing projects when 
NGOs and INGOs were working with partners. When it comes to changing the administrative 
factors it is different. Organizations like the UN and EU spend 5 -6 years setting up a system, 
and they discover that it doesn’t really work; it’s hard for them to go back. The informant 
said: “The UN doesn’t say to the Palestinian organizations, make your own forms that is 
locally acceptable, no, this is what we have for you here. You have to use this one that we 
made in New York.  Maximum input for you minimum input for us.” 
Another donor condition that was highly used was conditions on how and where the money 
was going to be spent. If you have a project and you get 100 000 dollar, the donors will 
demand an independent consultant to make an estimate of the project, and he has to be 
from a specific company. Everything you buy has to some from specific firms or from specific 
countries.  That takes a good chunk of you 100 000 and what you are left with, is a little 
labor for service providers. What goes to the local level is not much. 
5.7.2. Reporting 
Several of the informants told us that the reporting was a burden. In many cases you have to 
report to both the PA and GoI. You will also have to report to the INGOs you work with. The 
INGOs will have to report to the PA and GoI, as well as to the donors and home government. 
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As one informant told us; “reporting, reporting, reporting, who reads all this anyway?” The 
burden of reporting is on the organization receiving the money.  One informant from an 
INGO told us that they make their partners report on a quarterly basis and the donors want 
reporting from the partners and the INGO twice a year. Very little is done with the 
information collected. “It’s like having a giant survey and really just want to know the 
answers to a few questions and you give them a hundred question survey”. Another INGO 
informant told us that he felt that they followed up their partners to close. He was worried it 
could be perceived as they didn’t trust them.  
One informant from an INGO told us that if you do direct implementation you are 
responsible for every beneficiary. She gave us an example from USAID. Anything that is 
USAID funded will have to submit a beneficiary list and send it to Washington DC, and wait 
for anywhere from six weeks to six months for approval. If you then have a mistake you have 
to do the whole process again.  
5.7.3. Evaluation/ assessments 
In 2011, the PA became a part of the Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey. It allows the 
Government to assess the current status of aid effectiveness in Palestine, and has 
information on aid flows and aid effectiveness issues that require further improvement 
(Report to the ad hoc, PNA, apr 2011 p.20). The survey will also serve as a baseline for future 
progress. There has also been a progress in the forming of statistics, as the Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics are conducting more reports and getting the information out. 
That provides quantitative data that can be used for future references and research.  
The reports (World Bank, IMF, EU, PA) refer to GDP and other statistics such as employment 
rate, GNI, when speaking of development and progress, little is said about the actual 
situation on the ground, as we can see. The GIZ report (Hilal & Shalian, 2011), however, 
states in its methodology section that it is “based on an internationally developed 
methodology that a local participatory methodology, which involves the stakeholders in the 
local community and the local marked players within the various processes of production, 
export and distribution” (Hilal & Shalian, p.4). Further on how they have conducted the 
research they have used the “participatory rapid appraisal approach, which combines the 
use of different tools, obtaining information from various sources, and comparing them to 
reach an objective opinion” (Ibid, p.4). From Nablus, the GIZ report has consulted 42 people 
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at the local level, of a total of 64 that contributed to the report. Total amount in the report 
were 231 of 297 consulted at the local level. 
Situation in the NGO sector  
One informant from a NGO simply states; “we have forms”, when asked how they evaluate. 
In this NGO forms seemed to be the basic approach to any evaluation, monitoring or analysis 
that takes place. A different NGO however, asked; “Forms, who reads them anyways?”  And 
called the amount of paperwork that accumulated in the different levels down in the 
hierarchy; “the burden of reporting”. When the top level writes 10 pages in an evaluation, 
the level below writes 20, and the next, 40 pages. This results in an obscene amount of 
paper, but for what use? Two different NGOs say the amount of forms and papers that are 
requested in an evaluation or for the application for funding depend on the donor.  
According to one NGO, the Arab nations do not request as much paperwork as the European 
donors for instance.  
Reporting can be done at various levels; according to one NGO they report to the PA, the 
Israelis and their own donors/government. Another NGO say they only report to their head 
offices. One NGO says that donors lay a condition of reporting upon the organization, it’s 
not, however, always clear as to what you are responsible for reporting 
One NGO says they meet all the decision makers, country representatives, organizations, all 
depending on the certain sectors that are involved. To assess what projects to get involved 
in they start by the activity itself, and the need arise. Decisions on all activities are taken in 
advance, based on analysis. “Even the training courses, must depend on the need, and be 
measured beforehand.” According to one NGO their projects now are; “development, pure 
development, so it’s capacity building, it’s different than giving relief.” According to them, 
relief does not measure impact afterwards in the same way. They work in different sectors, 
and when they choose what organization to work with, they do it according to assessments 
done before. 
A second NGO says it’s hard to isolate the impact of a project, because there is always some 
hidden aid that is unaccounted for. The hidden aid is for instance families helping each 
other; it’s then hard to know what indicators to take into account and which ones not to 
measure. The NGO says they cannot present accurate reports of impact, only indications as 
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to what the impact is. This NGO claims its donors do evaluations and impact assessments, 
but do not share the results with them. They are uncertain of whether or not some results 
are shared with the head of the NGO, but not at their office level.  
When asked if they feel donors measure impact, one NGO said; “They focus on activities that 
cannot be measured, like awareness and gender sensitivity.” 
A different INGO say they have an annual plan, and update it as well. The monitoring and 
evaluation system is based on a set of indicators. The indicators help to measure if results 
are achieved or not. The numbers are based on indicators and previous numbers, a baseline. 
Who does this evaluation depends on the assessment, sometimes they visit the company, 
and sometimes this is not necessary. Other times they bring external evaluators, monitoring 
and evaluating specialists. This NGO also does monitoring during the course of a project to 
see if it is going according to the plan if not; “You start analyzing the reasons. You go deeply 
into reasons for it.” 
Another NGO say they don’t evaluate annually, because they are involved with projects that 
all have their own independent evaluations. And because of this, annual evaluations would 
be unnecessary.  
A donor informant told us that they had regular meters, and a research oriented monitoring 
vision. “There is an internal monitoring that we do often, but also an external monitoring 
that is done by an external independent consultant”.  
One informant from the government says assessments are executed better at this point, 
because of a strategic plan that all NGOs and donors need to follow. If they want to evaluate 
they have to see if the program fits with the strategy. “If they want to talk about any kind of 
projects, they have to follow our plan.”The strategic plan is not absolute, and does not work 
100 %, however, there is a huge improvement from the previous years.  
One informant from a PNGO that worked with private sector development told us that the 
general trend is that donors want quantitative measurements, but many things are hard to 
measure. Donors want the money to matter, and for the PA to work, but possibly look away 
from negative sides.  One NGO says there is a lack of planning on some donors behalf; “they 
just want to implement something without analyzing the situation on the ground”. 
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5.8 Knowledge of the situation on the ground 
Several of our informants told us that they don’t think the donors have the ground 
knowledge of what’s going on. One even said that donors and diplomats don’t even know 
the difference of area A, B and C. She said that she was surprised of the level of ignorance 
from the donors. The diplomats and donors sit in their offices in Jerusalem. They eat dinner 
in West Jerusalem, they don’t socialize in Ramallah and they never go to cities like Jenin or 
Hebron. They have their own drivers and their own roads so they don’t have to see the 
checkpoints. They have the knowledge of what’s going on; put its through reading reports. 
“You can read about Calandia and the Calandia process and how many go through there 
every day and how long they have to wait. But if you haven’t experienced it, it’s just 
numbers”. The donors blame security regulation for why they don’t travel more in the WB. 
Our informant told us that many of the security regulations where made fifteen years ago, 
and that the situation has changed since then. 
Another informant from a PNGO that worked with private sector development informant 
said that it was hard working with the donors. The donor didn’t know the details of what the 
community needs. Their projects are applied oriented not demand or mean oriented. They 
have projects up and running, and don’t take the local context in to consideration, he said. 
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6.0 Analysis 
 
In this part we will try to answer the question of how PA’s budget support, in Nablus, affects 
the private business sector and how local resources are used in international aid distribution 
in private sector business development. It is our opinion that as most of the aid coming to 
the otP is given as budget support this has ramifications for all parts of development and 
growth in the country, especially private sector business development.  
6.1Vulerability of the PA’s budget support 
Palestine’s GDP has grown, as we see from our findings; this is an indicator of development, 
as was presented by Ibrahim (2011). We see, however that this does not necessarily mean 
that there is true growth. UNCTAD states that it in 2010 has been a jobless growth, where 
the unemployment rate has not really gone down, and that the GDP was very low in the 
beginning and there has been a better use of existing resources. This created an unrealistic 
picture of the situation.  
Big parts of the economy is financed by outside funding as the tables show, nearly half  of 
the PA’s budget comes from external aid. In 2011 the total Palestinian deficit was nearly half 
a billion US dollars. Funding in recent years has shifted towards budget support, and from 
that again shifted towards development (see, figure 3). Of all aid that comes to oPt, most 
goes to the PA. As we see in the EU’s distribution of aid to Palestine, only 2 % of the aid goes 
to the private sector. The PA receives large amounts of money, and as we see from the PA’s 
expenditures, half of their budget goes towards wages. This creates a vulnerable system, 
highlighted by what we see from the 2012 budget, where there are already difficulties with 
covering the salaries. When half of the budget goes to wages, and the budget itself is mostly 
covered by donor funding, it shows the fragility in the system; vulnerable with a great sense 
of uncertainty.  
Because of the budget support’s size we can argue that the economy is an artificial one.  The 
limited amount of income that is generated from import and export, the “new” money that 
is generated comes from the Palestinians themselves. The amount is low, and the majority 
of funding comes from the “outside” as we have seen presented (see table 4 & 8). The 
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balance of funding for the running cost of the PA is unnatural and not sustainable in the long 
run.  
It can be debated whether the support is helping the PA or not. The planned external 
funding is decreasing every year, but if the actual expenses match the planned ones remains 
to be seen. The big deficit from 2011 (see figure 5), gives an indicator that this could be hard 
to achieve though. Uncertainty around the PA’s ability to meet its obligations and maintain 
its reform program could decrease business confidence and reduce economic growth. 
  
6.1.1. The politics of aid dependency 
It happens, as we have seen, that the PA doesn’t receive the funding they need, or that 
payments are late. When the PA employees don’t receive their salaries, it hurts local 
business because they don’t have capital to spend on products and services. This also 
became clear in our questionnaire, where 17 of 19 answered positive as to whether or not 
their business was affected when Hamas won the election in 2006 and the PA employees 
didn’t get paid. Withholding funding is, as our theory shows a way of making a political 
statement regarding opinions of a country’s regime, but as in this case it also causes 
problems for innocent parties, that has no power over these decisions, and indirectly hurts 
their business. 
There doesn’t need to be a complete stop of funding, as we saw in Case 2, to leave an 
impact on the business environment. The fact that the PA was late with their salaries, again 
because of lack of funding, has an impact on small businesses that live on a day to day basis. 
The PA being late with salaries caused a huge dent in Jbbarin’s income, which was a major 
factor in the closing of the vegetable shop. A lack of aid means that the PA can’t pay their 
salaries – which affects consumer’s capacity to purchase goods and products, which affects 
small businesses. This situation creates a vicious circle that is difficult to recover from.   
As we see in the oPt, the aid funding is highly unstable and varies according to the situation 
in donating countries, but also the changes and the situation in the oPt. In 2011 the oPt 
received less funding than it had in previous years, which is also the situation in 2012. From 
earlier we have seen what happened when Hamas won the elections and how the full 
membership in the UNESCO also had impacts on donor funding. This uncertainty and 
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unpredictability has ramifications for the economic environment as a whole. It is especially 
difficult to plan far ahead, when you don’t know if you will have the funding in order. The 
GDP is growing, but as we see in the reports, it’s mainly jobless, and the growth is happening 
because of exceeded growth in existing sectors, and not because of the creation of new jobs, 
the unemployment rate is also not affected in a positive way. The politics and funding are all 
indirect causes to what happens in the private business sector in Palestine. The issues at 
national level, causes problems on the local level.  
The occupation also has political aspects, especially with the international donor 
questioning, but not holding the Israelis accountable for the destruction of constructions 
built by donor money. As one major donor stated; “We are not strong enough politically”.  
 
6.1.2. Aid’s effect on the local dynamics 
In some parts of the World, and especially in Palestine where the government is not as 
strong, the NGOs take over the jobs (from the government); this could be civil services for 
instance. Where the government does not provide adequate service for its community, it’s 
an opportunity for the NGOs to step in. In some cases they “represent more effective, 
efficient, and less costly service-providers than governments; at the same time they are 
perceived as having closer access to marginalized groups” (Tabar & Hanafi, p.38). NGOs work 
as vehicles for democratization and essential components of civil society; “today NGOs 
deliver more official development assistance than the entire United Nations system” (Hanafi 
& Tabar, p.38). It is important though, that the NGOs do not entirely discredit and override 
the attempts of the local government to get back on its feet, and take control of the 
situation. NGOs need to give the responsibility back to the locals as soon as they see them 
capable of this.  
Aid creates job sectors that would not necessarily exist in a non-conflict situation, or not in 
such a major part. For instance translators, chauffeurs, security personnel, are all 
occupations that would not have such a big market in normal settings. It is a problem that 
the NGO’s offer “big money” compared to the private sector. As the NGO’s get funds from 
outside Palestine, they usually have more finances and can pay higher salaries.  
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This is a big problem in the Palestinian society. Most newly educated people start working in 
a NGO instead of the private sector, because the wages are better. This is again an 
illustration of an artificial situation, where the occupation sets its mark and creates an 
undesirable working climate. We see how educated people wish to seek opportunities 
elsewhere. The Palestinian society experiences a huge drain of resources, as educated 
people leave the country; the highly skilled migration. This is mostly due to the situation in 
the oPt and the fact that they don’t see a future there. This again affects the private sector 
growth, because you don’t have the best competitors for establishing new businesses as 
they have already left. The ones creating something new will then perhaps not be as skilled 
or capable in creating, and keeping a business sustainable.  
6.1.3. Aid’s effect on business development  
When most of the money coming from donors goes to cover PA’s expenses, it’s an 
undesirable environment for the private sector. As we have seen, different actors both 
donors and the government all encourage private sector growth, and see it as an important 
part of the improvement of the Palestinian economy. The insecurity and uncertainty that 
follows the salary payments and funding of the PA does not help on this part, and although 
there is talk of private sector growth, the funding doesn’t show the same willingness. One 
cause for this is naturally the PA’s plan of statehood building, and improvement of 
institutions. This takes up big parts of the budget, that could otherwise been used for private 
sector development. 
 
6.2 Aid distribution in private sector 
6.2.1 Aid to private sector 
As the findings show, there is a big difference in the amount of aid given to the private 
sector from the different donors. USAID give 25% of their aid to economic development, 
while the EU only gives 2%. In 2012 the EU spent their private sector development aid on 
paying back loans for the PA to the private banks. This means that private sector 
development aid from the EU also went to the PA, with the PA already getting huge amounts 
of aid in budget support.  
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All the actors in aid distribution and the economic institutions working in the oPt agree that 
the only way to get a sustainable economy is through private sector growth. Still, we see a 
difference in the priorities from the donors, as most of the international aid is given through 
budget support. In our search for the aid given to private sector development, the different 
donor countries use different labels on the different sectors they give aid to. Related to 
private sector development, Norway calls it Economic development and trade, the EU calls it 
private sector development and USAID calls it Economic development. Some donors were 
transparent as to what the private sector development aid went to, while others don’t 
specify what exactly is funded. The lack of transparency makes it hard for us to perform an 
accurate analysis of the priorities of the donors in private sector development. As we can see 
from the EU, however, the private sector development aid funding goes to paying back PAs 
loans and building up businesses that has been destroyed by the occupation.  
6.2.2. Aid priorities and the occupation 
As we can see from the findings, large amounts of the aid given to the oPt goes to 
humanitarian support. This is in many cases spent on building up what is destroyed by the 
occupation. It is difficult to speak about the process of private sector development in the 
Palestinian Territories without also speaking about the occupation. The restrictions on 
import and export, the lack of freedom of movement and the uncertainty the occupation 
presents for the private sector, leaves us with the question of how the private sector can 
grow under these circumstances.  
In 2009 the EU started private sector development projects that were meant to build up 
businesses that has been closed, or destroyed by Israel. Our informant from a major donor 
told us this was the price of occupation and that they didn’t feel politically strong enough to 
pressure Israel. With this in mind; is private sector development in the oPt only an illusion 
made up by donors to give the impression that they are trying to build up and help the 
private sector? The foreign aid frees the Israeli occupation from its international obligations 
towards the Palestinians, and lets them continue, because there are no economic incentives 
for the Israelis to stop the occupation.  
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6.2.3. Private Sector Aid representation in coordination  
As mentioned before, the oPt is one of the areas in the world that receives most 
international aid per capita. This makes aid coordination challenging. The local coordination 
mechanisms that are relevant for private sector are the Economic Strategy Group and the 
Private sector Development and Trade working group. As the findings show, the private 
sector’s only representation in the local coordination structure is in the Private Sector 
Development and Trade working group. They are represented by interest organizations for 
the private sector. They are not represented in the Economic strategy group. 
From the theory (Dekker & Suparamaniam, 2005) we see that communication from the blunt 
end to the sharp end often is bad because they see the world differently. HQ and donors are 
often far away from the conflict and don’t know the facts on the ground, the blunt end being 
HQ/donors. They are engaged with issues as economy and politics, while those who work on 
the ground are engaged with issues of what is needed at the time (Ibid). As our findings 
show, the donors, NGO, INGOs, UN agencies, World Bank, IMF all say that the private sector 
must be a priority for the Palestinian economy to be sustainable. But they are not 
represented in coordination mechanisms. How can donors and the PA make the right 
decision on economic issues when they don’t talk to the people who work in the private 
sector?  
The private sector businesses in oPt consists mostly of one to five employees, they are also 
often family based. Is it possible to have a representation of the “real” private sector in 
these mechanisms? One can argue that the interest groups are the best way to represent 
the private sector. But as our findings show the donors seldom travel in the West Bank, they 
don’t walk through the checkpoint or feel the occupation on their body. They read reports, 
statistics and numbers on the situation. We can then argue that this makes it even more 
important that the workers from private sectors on the ground are heard, the people who 
are affected by the decisions of these mechanisms.  
 
6.2.4. The Impact of Evaluation and reporting 
The reasons for the applying and reporting system is to ensure that the right 
families/persons get the aid, and that it is spent in the way according to the NGO’s/donor’s 
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wish. The evaluation is executed to identify potential negative impacts, and establish a valid 
counterfactual – what would happen if the intervention had not taken place (White, 2005, 
Hofman et al., 2004). The aim is to judge the probable environmental, social and economic 
consequences of development projects” (Hofmann et. Al., 2004).  This is all well and good, 
but as our findings show, it is harder than it sounds.  
The way aid is given has consequences for the private sector development. Our findings 
show that the larger businesses that have a good economy get grants, and the smaller 
businesses, in many cases don’t have the capacity to even apply. The donor conditions, such 
as reporting and applying systems, makes this hard for the small businesses to enter the 
“donor market”. In the following section we will try to give an answer to why this is the case. 
 
6.2.5. The impact of Bureaucracy  
Local context 
As our findings show, many of the application forms were in English and not Arabic. The 
application process is often online and they don’t have an alternative paper version if you 
don’t have internet access. An informant told us that the agencies don’t take into 
consideration what happens if you have a bad internet connection and it breaks before you 
get to fill out the application, or if you’re a slow typer. The applications also rarely come with 
guide notes. If you get one question wrong you risk waiting for the duration of the 
application process, and then get the message that you didn’t fill in the form correctly. We 
were told that people for a long time have asked for a standardized reporting and applying 
systems.   
We asked an informant how you could change the system do make it more accessible for 
people, she said: “Almost nobody goes and ask the local people and local organizations, how 
it can be changed. What is practical in their capacity, what would they like to see be done.  
They are the fractional voice in the whole discussion”.  As Hanafi and Tabar (p. 183-184) 
remarks in their study; “… upon close inspection we found that community participation is 
often used as a slogan: it is discussed as a method, but when probed as to how it’s applied, 
there is little substance behind the celebratory proclamation…“ Standardization is a way to 
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cooperate with the beneficiaries and local businesses on their terms. It would create more 
efficient systems, and make it easier for those using them. 
In many cases, the small businesses with one to five employees don’t have the sufficient 
capacity needed to do the applying process. The larger businesses sometimes have their own 
departments who specialize in this, and will therefore be the ones who receive the funding. 
This could of course be a good thing for the larger businesses, as they will be able to develop 
further, but the system as a whole has some faults that need to be rectified.  
This is an example of people adapting to the condition they are in. Anderson (2008) explains 
this; when you have a large flow of capital in a sector or an area it will affect the dynamics of 
the sector.  It will change the power balance, and it will make sectors that in non-conflict 
setting would be un-natural (Anderson, 2008). She also warns the actors working in these 
areas to be aware of this and take precautions, to do as little harm as possible to the local 
structures. We claim that the applying and reporting system made by donors and NGOs has 
made an impact on the structure of business development. The lager businesses have a 
better chance at receiving funds because of their capacity in the application process. They 
have perhaps better language skills and knowledge of the aid system that they have adapted 
to because they are capable and have the resources. The smaller businesses don’t have this 
and get bypassed. One can argue that it’s better for the business environment that the 
larger companies get the grants, because they then have the possibility to expand. This will 
create more workplaces, and the unemployment rate could decline. In a business 
development aspect, however, the consequence is that the small businesses get bypassed 
and don’t get the support that could make a difference, not only for the business but their 
whole family, and in turn generate growth in the private sector.  
How international aid changes incentives for business development 
Medium/large businesses 
The medium and large businesses have, according to our findings often own departments 
that’s only focus is on applying for aid and handle the aid bureaucracy. This means that the 
international aid distribution has created a system that has incentivized this activity. The 
businesses use manpower and resources on the bureaucracy of aid instead of developing 
their own businesses further.   
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Small businesses 
As our findings show, there are NGOs that offer private businesses to prepare all the work 
for them to open. They do all the paperwork, business plans, and financial plans and so on.  
According to one informant most of these businesses closed within 6 months. One can argue 
that with the NGO doing all the work for the beneficiaries they don’t get a feeling of business 
ownership or accountability. The motivation you have when creating something for yourself 
is higher, than when you don’t have anything to lose.  The NGOs are trying to help, but might 
do the exact opposite by changing incentives for private sector to development.  
Learning 
The point of evaluations and assessments is to learn from them (Kaiser, 2004). Kaiser argues 
that “… humanitarian actors are beginning to recognize that assessing the actual impact of 
their work is more valid than simply measuring output in material terms” (Kaiser, 2004, p.8). 
This means that evaluators need to look to participants, and conduct beneficiary based 
evaluations.  As mentioned in our findings, informants told us that the reporting was a 
burden, with no element of learning, or discussions of the challenges and failures in the 
process.   
In many cases you have to report to both the PA and GoI. You will also have to report to the 
INGOs you work with. The INGOs will have to report to the PA and GoI, as well as to the 
donors and home government. When the top level writes 10 pages in an evaluation, the 
level below writes 20, and the next, 40 pages. This results in an obscene amount of paper, 
but for what use?  Little is done with the information collected; informants said that they 
don’t even think all these papers are being read. When the system of reporting does makes 
it so that nobody reads the reports, one can ask what the point of it is.  
We were told by an informant that the use of local resources was a priority when 
establishing projects where NGOs and INGOs were working with partners. When it came to 
changing the administrative factors it was different. Organizations like the UN and EU spend 
5 -6 years setting up a system, to discover that it doesn’t really work; it makes it hard for 
them to go back. The informant said: “The UN doesn’t say to the Palestinian organizations; 
make your own forms that are locally acceptable, no, this is what we have for you here. You 
have to use this one, which we made in New York.” 
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When you have as many different actors as you have in the oPt, there should be a better 
system for learning from own failures. The transparency in previously conducted studies and 
evaluations are lacking, and in some ways making different actors to the same work that 
already has been done, because results are not shared. When reports are requested, there 
should be more consideration and thought going into what and how they are used, making a 
system that would be beneficiary for both parts. 
6.2.6 Donors 
Knowledge on the ground 
Dekker & Suparamaniam (2005) explain how HQ and donors often are away from the 
conflict and don’t know the facts on the ground. Issues can often be black and white for 
HQ/donors. They priorities issues like economy and politics, while field workers are engaged 
with issues of what is needed on the ground (Dekker & Suparamaniam, 2005).  This makes it 
hard for field workers to communicate the complexity of the situation, because they have 
two different views of the situation.  
Several of our informants told us that they don’t think the donors have the ground 
knowledge of what’s going on. They don’t travel in the West Bank and they have their own 
drivers that don’t have to drive through or see the checkpoints. The knowledge they have is 
from reading reports. Will you get the right view of how the private sector is affected by the 
occupation or the reporting system when you don’t talk to them, or don’t visit the people 
who are affected, and you don’t know how it is to live under occupation?  
There can also be a gap between knowledge and authority. Those who have knowledge of 
what to do, do not have the authority to take decisions, and those who don’t have the 
knowledge of what is needed on the ground is authorized to decide (Kruke & Olsen, 2010; 
Dekker & Suparamaniam, 2005). An informant from a PNGO told us that it was frustrating to 
work with donors, they had their proposals and they didn’t have any influence of making any 
changes. “The donors don’t know the details of what the community needs. They are not 
taking the local context into consideration”.  
What is evaluated? 
One NGO says there is a lack of planning on some donors behalf; “they just want to 
implement something without analyzing the situation on the ground”. The point of 
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evaluations and assessments is to learn, for the donors perhaps more to see results, but also 
the aspect of accountability. Currently accountability is faced upwards; to donors, trustees 
and other stakeholders, when in fact it should be downward, to those receiving assistance 
(Kaiser, 2004).One informant from a PNGO that worked with private sector development 
told us that the general trend is that donors want quantitative measurements, but many 
things are hard to measure. Donors want the money to matter, and for the PA to work, but 
then possibly look away from negative sides. As the ALNAP (2009) states, it is quite clear that 
donors appreciate results, and because of this NGOs often evaluate outputs of projects in a 
manner that pleases the donor. The way evaluations are conducted could predetermine the 
information gathered (Kaiser, 2004). 
 There is a chance that true findings are kept unnoticed and undisclosed because they are 
found uninteresting for the donor, by those evaluating. Too much is expected by too many 
different stakeholders (ALNAP, 2009). An informant from an NGO told us that they don’t 
receive the evaluations, that the donors don’t share the results. This means that the learning 
element falls away from the people at field level.  
 
6.3 Summary 
There are two dimensions for the lack of communication and coordination with local 
resources in aid distribution; the structure on how aid is given, implemented and evaluated, 
and the occupation. The donors and INGOs don’t communicate with the PNGOs and the 
locals to the degree they could. They also don’t know the fact on the ground as well as they 
could, how it is to run a business while living under occupation. The consequence being that 
aid is given in a way that harms the private sector development. On top of this the private 
sector has to run their businesses under occupation with all the extra cost and uncertainty 
this represents.  
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7.0 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to study how international aid affects business development 
in Nablus. International aid makes the city of Nablus vulnerable. Private sector runs their 
businesses in uncertainty, both from the vulnerability of the PA and the occupation.  
International aid affects business development in Nablus in several ways, both directly and 
indirectly. Fist directly, in the way the aid is distributed. This is through the reporting and aid 
application process, as well as the evaluating and assessment system. These systems are 
made by donors and INGO headquarters. They are far from the conflict and seldom travel or 
communicate with the beneficiaries. This creates an environment where local recourses are 
not listened to in the degree they should. The consequences being that projects are 
executed and aid is given in ways that are not necessarily needed on the ground. In many 
cases the businesses that receive the aid are not the ones that need it.  
The business development is also affected indirectly by the PAs budget support. The huge 
amount of aid the PA receives makes them vulnerable for political pressure from the donor 
countries. If the PA doesn’t behave in a way the donor countries approve of, they could stop 
the aid flow. As our findings show, this has happened on several occasions. If the PA doesn’t 
get their budgets in balance they risk not being able to pay their employees. With the PA 
being the largest employer in the oPt, it makes private sector vulnerable. If the PA can’t pay 
salaries to its employers, they cannot purchase products from the private sector, and the 
private sector will stagnate.  
In addition to this you have the occupation, the restrictions on import and export, the lack of 
freedom of movement, the permit system etc. All these conditions put together makes it 
hard for the private sector to develop and grow. We will also argue that the occupation is 
the main problem for business development, this because of the politics of the aid given. In 
many cases the donors pay for the destructions of the occupation, and Israel is not given any 
incentives to end the occupation. As long as the occupation is a fact, real development is not 
possible. With the donors paying for the destruction, the state building and the PA’s budget 
support how can real development occur; “It’s the price of occupation”.  
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It is difficult to be absolutely certain of our findings, and further research should be done on 
the impacts of aid on the private sector. It would be interesting to study how the focus on 
private sector in the coming years changes, and how the private business will develop. The 
decreasing of budget support may or may not cause problems for the private sector; this 
could also be an interesting aspect for further studies. 
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Appendix 1 
1. When was this business established?    Year/month:__________             
2. Have you ever applied for aid?     Yes  No 
3. Have you ever received aid?      Yes   No 
4. Did you receive aid to establish your business?   Yes  No 
5. Could you run your business without aid?   Yes   No 
6. Do you think aid is distributed fairly?    Yes  No 
7. Do you think it’s possible for Palestine to become aid-independent by 2014, like the PA 
wants?         Yes  No 
8. In 2006 the PA did not receive tax-money, and could not give salaries to their employees, 
did you feel the effects of this in your business?   Yes  No 
9. Do you work with INGO’s?     Yes  No 
10. If yes, is the cooperation positive for your business  Yes  No 
Please answer the following questions on the scale from 1-10 where 1 is the lowest/most 
negative, and 10 is the highest/most positive answer.  
11. How good do you think aid is for the local businesses?    
1   2   3  4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
12. How satisfied are you with the PA’s work for economic development?  
1   2   3  4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
13. On a scale from 1-10, how much do you think business owners can affect aid distribution?  
1   2   3  4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
14. On a scale from 1-10, how positive do you consider international aid?  
1   2   3  4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
15. On a scale from 1-10, how do you view the future for your business? 
1   2   3  4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
16. On a scale from 1-10, how positive is cash for work and food distribution aid, in your 
opinion?  
1   2   3  4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
 59
 
 2 xidneppA
 ______________:الشهر /متى تم إنشاء هذا العمل؟                                                                   السنة.1
 هل سبق و أن قدمت طلب للحصول عل مساعده؟                                             نعم                         لا .2
 على مساعده ؟                                                           نعم                          لاهل سبق و أن حصلت .3
 نعم                          لا هل سبق و أن حصلت على  مساعده لإنشاء مشروعك الخاص؟                           .4
 نعم                          لا                  ؟                        ههل كان بإمكانك إدارة مشروعك من دون مساعد.5
   نعم                          لاهل تعتقد بان المساعدات توزع بشكل عادل؟                                                  . 6
سلطة كما تريد ال,  4112ى المساعدات بحلول العام هل تعتقد بأنه من الممكن لفلسطين أن تصبح غير معتمده عل.7
 ؟  الفلسطينية
 نعم                             لا        
 هل,ولم تكون قادرة على دفع رواتب موظفيها , لم تتلقى السلطة الفلسطينية عائدات الضرائب  6112في العام . 8
  نعم                             لا             شعرت بأثر ذلك على عملك الخاص؟                     
 ؟                نعم                             لا هل تعمل مع المؤسسات الغير حكومية المستقلة. 9
 لا     نعم                        هل كان لهذا التعاون الأثر الايجابي على عملك؟      ,جابتك السابقة نعم إذا كانت إ. 11
و الرقم ,الأكثر سلبية  /هو الإجابة  الأقل 1حيث الرقم 11 -1الرجاء الإجابة عن الأسئلة التالية بناءا على المقياس من 
 .ايجابية الأكثر /هو الإجابة الأعلى11
 ما مدى أهمية المساعدة للمشاريع المحلية باعتقادك؟.11
 1 __  2 ____3 ___ 4__ __  5_____6   ____7____8 ____ 9_____01
 21.ما مدى رضاك عن عمل السلطة الفلسطينية في  التطوير الصناعي؟
 1 __  2 ____3 ___ 4__ __  5_____6   ____7____8 ____ 9_____01
  باعتقادك كم  يؤثر أصحاب المشاريع  في  توزيع المساعدات؟,11-1بناءا على المقياس من .31
 1 __  2 ____3 ___ 4__ __  5_____6   ____7____8 ____ 9_____01
 بنظرك ما مدى ايجابية المساعدات الأجنبية ؟  ,11-1بناءا على المقياس من .41
 1 __  2 ____3 ___ 4__ __  5_____6   ____7____8 ____ 9_____01
 51 ؟ تك حول عملك في المستقبلما مدى ايجابي, 11-1بناءا على المقياس من .
 1 __  2 ____3 ___ 4__ __  5_____6   ____7____8 ____ 9_____01 
 
 61. برأيك الخاص؟,ما مدى  ايجابية الأموال و توزيع المساعدات الغذائية 11-1بناءا على المقياس من .
 1 __  2 ____3 ___ 4__ __  5_____6   ____7____8 ____ 9_____01  
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Appendix 3 
Table E1: Economic costs of the Israeli occupation for the Palestinian territory,            USD ‘000 and 
% of GDP (2010) 
 
                                                                                                         Cost ('000 USD)                      %GDP 
 
Gaza blockade                                                                                  1,908,751                                 23.5% 
Indirect costs of water restrictions                                               1,903,082                                 23.4% 
Value Added from irrigation                                          1,219,667                                 15.0% 
Jordan Valley agriculture                                                   663,415                                   8.2% 
Health costs from water                                                      20,000                                   0.2% 
Natural resources                                                                            1,837,738                                  22.6% 
Dead Sea salts and minerals                                          1,102,869                                  13.6% 
Value added from quarries                                               574,869                                    7.1% 
Gas marine reserve                                                             160,000                                   2.0% 
Direct utility costs                                                                                492,788                                   6.1% 
Direct electricity costs                                                        440,876                                    5.4% 
Direct water costs                                                                 51,912                                    0.6% 
Intl. Trade restrictions                                                                        288,364                                    3.5% 
Dual use (excl agriculture)                                                 120,000                                    1.5% 
Dual use agriculture                                                            141,972                                    1.7% 
Cost of trading                                                                        26,392                                    0.3% 
Movement restrictions                                                                        184,517                                    2.3% 
Dead Sea tourism                                                                                  143,578                                   1.8% 
Uprooted trees                                                                                      138,030                                   1.7% 
 
Direct costs                                                                                         3,012,451                                37.1% 
Indirect costs                                                                                      3,884,398                                47.8% 
 
TOTAL                                                                                                 6,896,849                                84.9% 
 
Fiscal costs                                                                                          1,795,685 
Memo item 
Nominal Palestinian GDP (2010) 8,124,000 
 
(PMNE & ARIJ, 2011) 
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Appendix 4 
Interview guide 
Questions for NGO/INGO 
1. What kind of aid do you feel effects business development? Why?  
2. How do you distribute aid? 
3. Do the donors have conditions, are they fair?  
4. Do you evaluate the effects of your work? 
5. Do you view your work as aid or development? 
6. How does the conflict affect your work? 
7. How should international aid be distributed?  
8. What do you think about the PAs work towards aid independence?  
9. How is the cooperation between NGOs and local business? 
10. How are the conditions in Nablus?  
11. How do you cooperate with the PA? 
12. How do you coordinate between the different partners you work with?  
13. How is the cooperation between INGOs and PNGOS?  
14. How are local resources used? 
 
 
Questions specific for business owners 
1. Why have you chosen this business?  
2. How does the conflict affect your business? 
3. Have you applied for or received aid or grants?  
4. If yes, are there conditions you have to follow? 
5. How is your cooperation with INGOs?  
6. How does the PA help with the establishment of new businesses? 
7. Palestine aid independent by 2014?  
8. What is your relationship with the PA?  
9. How is Nablus different from other parts in the West Bank? 
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Questions for government employees 
1. Could you tell us about the aid situation in Nablus 
2. How do you work to get aid independent?  
3. Do you have a backup plan if the aid stops?  
4. How does the conflict effect business development? 
5. In what way can you influence international aid? 
6. How do you work long-term?  
 
Academica:  
1 How does the conflict affect business development? 
2 Do you think the aid affects business development? 
3 How should aid be distributed?  
4 What do you think of PAs work concerning aid and business development?  
5 Local actors?  
 
 
